Miscellaneous notes on connections between Chinese philosophy and Heidegger’s Being and Time:

I) HISTORY & LANGUAGE

History: 

Chinese philosophy’s relation to history is intimate and of utter importance—both history in its normal meaning, as in the past, and their history in the sense of the immediacy of the times they were living in.  We have a great number of early Chinese “histories,” which we would likely describe as chronicles (quite literally so, they were long records chronicling events, sometimes on a day by day basis for a writer’s whole life span).  An important idea and symbol in the histories, which we will also encounter in Chinese philosophy, is the “mirror:” histories were written and speeches recorded in order that one now or in the future could use the stories of the past as a mirror offering a image we ought to reflect, and thereby guide us to the proper action.  The Confucians prize history perhaps the most, although we can see the importance and prevelance of historical references in almost all schools of Chinese philosophy.  This constant referencing of past leaders, citizens, thinkers, and events (with the aim of pointing out “morals” to be followed) can make for difficult reading because what held significance in the references would have been cultural knowledge, understood by all those who read it without need for explanation.  Scholarship aids us greatly with the contexts, although many references are today unclear, leaving us to only infer what exact “moral” is being designated. 

Now, in Heidegger, we see history also surface in a multiplicity of senses, and his evaluation echoes the tone of the Chinese, even as it may have a very different employment. 

For example, Heidegger begins Being and Time with the need to recall the importance of the question of Being.  In the Frontspiece and the first lines of Heidegger’s Introduction we are immediately confronted with Plato’s expression of the perplexity of the question of the meaning of Being.  Periodically, he recalls to our attention Aristotle, Bergson, Kant, Hegel, and the Medievals’ interpretations or lack thereof of the ontological character of Being.  And, the final, never completed sections of B&T were to have been, according to Heidegger, a review and deconstruction (destruction, too, in some ways) of the entire canonical history of metaphysics (a project we see his later writings tackle, too).  Finally, and most poignantly, we see in Chapter 2 part 6 of the Introduction (“The Task of a Destructuring of the History of Ontology”) the differentiation of history and historicity—which will be important throughout the text).  “History” is in the sense of world history, stories and facts about the past.  “Historicity” is that which is prior to history, that which is the ground/foundation for history.  Historicity, Heidegger says, means “the constitution of Being of the ‘occurrence’ of Dasein as such,” which means that historicity is that which founds and makes up Being of Da-sein’s possibility of being/existing. 

With this differentiation we can see an echo of the dual-sense of history that the Chinese employ, that history of the past and of the present (one could say there is also a futural dimension here since they write in change of a hope for a new or return to a better society).  Heidegger says that Da-sein is its past in the manner of its Being that occurs our of its future.  Da-sein is futurally oriented.  It is ek-sistence (an ek-stasis)—a standing beyond itself, or outside of itself.  Here, we see how historicity and temporality relate in their, if not synonymous at least very compatible, mutual defining of Da-sein.  Da-sein’s past goes ahead of it.  This idea is fundamentally the same as Husserl’s protention, the forward projection as a sort of anticipation into the future, thereby pulling the future into our present “now.”

Now, this this futural dimension raises an interesting question.  Confucius and the latter Confucians, make it clear that there IS a better future to be had in a return to the Golden Age of the Past.  The promotion of a “BETTER” future implies that there are steps to be taken to achieve this, and on this level, this applies to nearly all Chinese thinkers—even the Taoists with their passive activity towards harmony, the Tao.  If this is so, then is this any different than an ethics?  More concretely, we can consider Confucius’ promotion of benevolence and familial piety (both indicative of traditional ethics).  Does Heidegger have an ethics in this Being-futural?  (The two divisions of B&T are hinged together by “care,” and Division Two rigorously explores the “Call of Conscience,” hence, he clearly has an ethic, but, the question is whether this is or is not the same as what can be interpreted as an ethic in these very early passages on time.)

A possible interpretation of an ethics in Heidegger’s Introduction:  [[here, again, invoking Husserl, namely his Crisis of European Sciences]] Heidegger has just broached his discussion of the ontological priority of the question of the meaning of Being, and suddenly we are shifted into a discussion of the separation and delineation of the “sciences” or the areas of possible study, or disciplines (i.e., history, nature, space, life, language, human being, etc.).  We soon understand that the point is that “scientific research” demarcates and establishes these areas, but that their foundations, their fundamental structures are established in the domain of Being, and that this domain encompasses all these areas.  [[it is the concept that is dichotomized into seemingly separate fields of inquiry]].  So how can this possibly show an ethics?  Well, to suggest this is an ethics may be blasphemous to what Heidegger is doing, in that it is confusing the question of the meaning of Being—the fundamental question—First Philosophy à la Aristotle—with a derivation, the practical realm of philosophy—BUT—maybe it is not blasphemous.  To divide Being into seemingly different realms is to obscure the foundational nature of Being.  What his project is is to lay bare this fundamental question.  Essentially, we can read this as a necessity of seeing Being without the glasses of science, REASON; to EXPERIENCE the CLEARING of Being.  In order to see Being without the obscuration of the presuppositions of scientific thinking (i.e. “technology”) we need to look at Being through the PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE, not the mathematization of Nature into convention (i.e. Husserl’s Mathematical Attitude).  We see the natural by turning away from the “idle talk” of technology, of science.  A return to a “traditional” view.  Here is almost an ethics, although it is not a normative ethics (i.e. rule book style) like how the Confucians outline it (hence, we may just wonder whether this movement is Taoist in its methodology … is there anyway out of this interpretation?). 

Can I justify this being an ethics?  The aim: to return to the question of the meaning of Being [perhaps, more so, to reignite the affective experience of perplexity that propels us to return to the question of being, and to do so in the attenuation).  How?  By experiencing the perplexity of the question—or—by turning away from the easy explanations of science and looking at the complexity of the unitary foundation: Being.  Why?  Because today we do not know what the meaning of being is, despite our touting of metaphysics, because our Being is the most fundamental question that we can ask. 

Can I justify this not being a horrific interpretation for Heidegger?  To not sound nearly normative?  To not commit a metaphysical error?  To not slip into ontic designations?  To be emotively pedagogic, instead?  Possibly, if I can show that the question of the meaning of being has a relation to the world and that in the world there is something we need to DO to get back to the question.  Thus:

(1) The question of the meaning of Being has paradoxical dual priorities: the ontological and the ontic.  The ontological priority does not begin in sciences—yet has an originary base in the ontic—in the natural attitude for Husserl—the ontic is NOT our foundation, yet IS our foundation.  While the ontic is the attitude of being where the ontological question of being is not raised, I suggest that without the ontic there is no possibility of raising the question as well—which explains the need for Heidegger to have the ontic-ontological status.  It is in the Being of Da-sein to have, in its Being, a relation of Being to this Being.  The Being that Da-sein relates to is EXISTENCE.  This is how Da-sein understands itself—by the ability, the possibility of choosing to be or not to be itself.  (This is not solipsism—see p.48).  In this relation of the ontic and the ontological, we are already mingling the traditional divisions of First Philosophy and Practical Philosophy.  [[Da-sein is (as possessing of an existentiell characteristic) being-in-the-world]]

(2)  Entanglement/Ensnarement:  “… Dasein not only has the inclination to be ensnared in the world in which it is and to interpret itself in terms of that world by its reflected light; at the same time Dasein is also ensnared in a tradition which it more or less explicitly grasps.  This tradition deprives Dasein of its own leadership in questioning an choosing.”  This tradition bars Dasein access to fundamental Being in tricking-it-up in the “idle talk” of the world. 

Therefore, the first point shows the interrogated subject—Da-sein—to be involved in existence—the ontic—the everyday world, yet be the means by which we are going to do an ontological investigation.  Therefore, in the mingling of practical and First philosophies Heidegger has clearly delineated a connection between the question of the meaning of Being and beings.  The second point picks up this mingling and shows Da-sein in the world being distracted from the question.  The opening lines of the book tell us the necessity of the return to a genuine investigation of the question of the meaning of Being.  Therefore, we need to get back to Being, but the hectic world keeps us from it; thus, implicitly there is the obstacle we need to overcome—we need to not let the world preoccupy us with idleness.  A non-normative ethical theory—we NEED to return to what we lost by turning away from the world. 

Of course, it is an oversight to simply skip over the question of how influenced does Heidegger seem by history and his own (German) history?  Heidegger was involved with the Nazi party, if this can be considered part of his contemporary history, why does he not (with the possible exceptions of the Der Spiegel interview, some letters, and a bit in his Black Notebooks) fully, clearly address this?  Heidegger, adopting his phenomenological approach to the question of “Being” from his teacher Husserl, wants to radicalize it by attaching it more firmly to existence—hence the Da-sein, being-there.  If he wants a more concrete philosophy, why does HIS history not seem to surface?  Besides the fact that this is outside the realm of philosophy and moving into a hermeneutical crit position, is not the end of the book a sort of recognition of a return to the structures—the [German national] tradition?  An aestheticization of nature in later works … These are pretty critical questions given:

“Every metaphysical question can be asked only in such a way that the questioner as such is present together with the question, that is, is placed in question” (Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?,” Basic Writings, 93).  “We are like plants which—whether we like to admit it to ourselves or not—must with our roots rise out of the earth in order to bloom in the ether and bear fruit” (Heidegger, “Memorial Address,” Discourse on Thinking, 47, wherein he is paraphrasing the poet Johann Peter Hebel).  “I work concretely and factically out of my ‘I am,’ out of my intellectual and wholly factic origin, milieu, life-contexts, and whatever is available to me from these as a vital experience in which I live” (Heidegger, letter to Karl Löwith, 8/19/1921).

Move away from history—move towards Language:

I have referred to the ensnarement of Dasein into the world by a certain distraction by “Idle Talk.”  Heidegger admits (On the Way to Language, and reprinted elsewhere, “Interview with the Japanese”) that in addition to or in conjunction with the question of Being comes the question of language.

Language has a division just like the ontic-ontological and existentiell-existential divisions in that there is Idle Talk and there is Discourse (and the Call of Being).  This idea of the importance of language, however, also develops, although subtly in the Introduction. 

FIRST—however, how does language factor into Chinese thought?  We will see the importance and consequences of language in a number of ways:

(1)  China, being a vast and diverse country where most people were strictly regionalized, is home to over thirteen basic dialects.  Regimes throughout history have tried to simplify and standardize the language.  The dialects are so diverse, while written, any exchange could be mostly understood, if spoken, the speakers would each find the other incomprehensible.  (Consider the number of essays on the rectification of names—i.e. the “fixing” of names to be more standard and proper.)

(2)  The language employed is far more eloquent, descriptive than what the West would consider “rigorous” “rational” language to be used for philosophy.  [[Structuring of our thinking by language—structural underpinnings of reality—nexus of one’s language]].

(3)  The structure of Chinese, due to both its monosyllabic quality and its frequent need to combine two characters together to make one new word, fosters an ability to think relationally.  It is an interesting comparison of words/characters in what each tells us alone.  For example, in English and other European languages, if we look at one single word, it can tell us, normally, gender, number, and case (depending on which language).  Further, a noun is a thing in our language-family; it is a substance.  In Chinese, however, a character will not tell us gender, number, nor case, these can only be understood by the context.  Further, any Chinese character pretty much can become a noun depending on where it is placed in the phrase.  [[Here we can see how language structure can influence how we think about things]].

So, taking these three very literal examples of unique employments of language in Chinese thought—what does this say philosophically about language? 

Perhaps the answer is the same as what is alluded to in Heidegger’s Introduction:  We see the allusion in fragments sprinkled throughout—

(1) He begins his book with a quote from a DIALOGUE.

(2)  The switch from Chapter 1 part 1 to part 2 is a movement from questioning what is the answer to the question of being where he discusses definition to the questioning of the question of being.  Language, question, becomes slightly psychological and physical; it is an “attitude” and we “stand in an understanding” of the question.

(3) “What is sought in the question of Being is not something completely unfamiliar, although it is at first totally ungraspable.”  To grasp it we must name it?

(4) “In the ordinary and also the philosophical ‘definition,’ Dasein, that is, the Being of man, is delineated as zoon logon echon [living animal able to speak; rational animal], that creature whose Being is essentially determined by its being able to speak.  Legein [discoursing] (see section 7 B) is the guideline for arriving at the structures of Being of the beings we encounter in discourse and discussion.”  The definition of Dasein will relate to Being and to language, as those beings who can speak.  [[Also—Logos as speech, word, reasoning, ground—that from which we come]].  [[Noein is an intuitive apprehending, a (re)presentation; a thought]]. 

Language and Being.  How are they separated?  Are they the same?  Does one form the other?  [[Connect, obviously, to Wittgenstein]]. 

Random Note:

Language, thematically, is developed perhaps the best in his essay/book “The Way to Language,” although etymology plays a crucial role to his thinking (as it does for Nietzsche) throughout his works.  What do you think would differ or stay the same in thought between two very different languages?  In Being and Time, Heidegger relies upon Greek, a non-Roman alphabet language to open up meanings not readily apparent to us, in a similar manner to the content of his curiosity about Japanese (and Asian languages in general) in his later works (contrast this to Hegel’s dismissal of Chinese characters as ill developed).  How do you think the interest in non-Roman alphabets connects to the topics and goals he discusses in the Introduction? 

Even more Random, random note:

Confucius: leading back to an ideal age, not an innovator. 

Heidegger: “Whether the answer is ‘novel’ is of no importance and remains extrinsic.  What is positive about the answer must lie in the fact that it is old enough to enable us to learn to comprehend possibilities prepared by the ‘ancients’” (Basic Writings, 62).