Walter Kaufmann’s Critique of Philosophy and Religion:

The Relationship between Words and Experiences, and how Emotions play a role (cf., §§27-8):

1. How does naming attack a thing/experience?  How is naming a judgment?
   

2. Is there another way to view names?  Honorifically?  How else do we know something, other than by names and definitions? 
   

3. If a name does not do justice to a thing/experience, what does the name not capture?
   

4. Can this excess be captured?  How does a definition differ from something’s ‘whole’ meaning?
   

5. Relation to Religion: Why do we try to define “religion” (and religions)?  If naming is judging, can we study them without judging them?  What, within them, do we judge?  What would these judgments ignore? 
   

Definitions of Religion and Truth (cf., §§33-5):

1. What are the different types of definitions?  Would you add any others to his list?  Are any of these definitions any good?  What are their shortcomings? 
   

2. Why not treat religious propositions like a defense attorney?  What does this say about truth?
   

3. Why are there not different ‘types’ of truth?  What is the flaw in thinking so?  If there is more meaning to things than a definition captures, why is this excess not rightly called its other truths?
   

4. What does one mean by subjective truth?  What is the relation between truth and correctness? 
   

5. Relation to Religion: What bearing does truth have to religion?  What criteria do we use to judge religions propositions? 
   

Knowledge, Belief, Faith (cf., §§36, 38-9):

1. What is the classic definitions of knowledge and belief; what are their definitions for Christianity?  Which is superior, which inferior, for each tradition?  What impact comes from changed definition?
   

2. What is the relation between truth an knowledge and truth and belief?  What is certainty?
   

3. What is the distinction between belief in the wider sense and in the narrower sense?
   

4. What is faith? 
   

5. What are the three main types of religious propositions?  How do the different types demand different means of judgment and evaluation?
   

6. Are revelation or miracles conclusive evidence?  What difference does this reveal between truth and evidence?  What difference does this reveal between knowledge and belief?
   

Origins/Causes/Sources of belief (cf., §§40-1):

1. Why would one and why should we not reject asking about causes?  Should we question beliefs?
   

2. What can we learn from asking about causes?
   

Ambiguity (§§50-1):

1. What keeps meaning from being certain? 
   

2. What are some different ways we mean “God?”  What are different ways we mean “exists,” when asking about God’s existence? 
   

3. What are the two approaches to propositions asking about the meaning of “God?”  How can the answers or their meaning differ between these approaches, and what does this difference mean?
   

4. What are the two levels of meaning of “exists?” 
   

5. Why do we not want to multiply the types of existence possible?
   

6. What is ambiguity?  How is it normally thought of?  How does Kaufmann intend it?  Does ambiguity harm religion?  Why would one think so; how can it not do so?
   

7. How does ambiguity prohibit true or false judgments?
   

8. Can we know something about the religious without the ideas of true and false?
   

9. What is dogma?  What do we mean when we ask what it means?  Is dogma meaningful?
   

10.