Contents:

I) On Aristotle

II) On His Works

III) On His Influence

IV) On Aristotle’s Philosophy

V) Overview of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

VI) Terminology in or about Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

VII) Textual Analysis: The Nicomachean Ethics

I) On Aristotle:

Aristotle (384-322 bce) was born in Macedon (now a part of Northern Greece), whose rulers tried hard to present themselves as Greeks, although many Greeks considered them foreigners, thus, while Aristotle spent much of his life in Athens, he was not an Athenian citizen and was more susceptible to the greater region’s political turmoil than most Athenians.  He was Plato’s most distinguished pupil, studying under him for 20 years at the Academy (367-347 bce); upon Plato’s death in 347 bce, Aristotle travelled widely, started a family, became the tutor to Alexander the Great, and then returned to Athens in 334 bce to start his own school called the Lyceum, which he ran until political upset began at the death of Alexander, which led Aristotle to leave for the island of Euboea, where he died in 322 bce. 

While he had been Plato’s student for two decades, his intellectual energy and writings were concerned with refining and revising his master’s ideas or, as some argue and it may often seem, rebelling against him.  One main contrast we can see between the two is in terms of their theoretical frameworks: whereas Plato emphasizes a priori truths (innate, universal truths from reason alone called the theory of Forms or sometimes Ideas), Aristotle works from the empirical (he seeks truths, but those demonstrable and not just accessible through reason alone, either literally so, as in his more biological works, or methodologically so, as in his focus on identifying something’s causes).  Another apparent contrast is in their styles: Plato’s works are in dialogues, typically presented as demonstrations of the teachings of his teacher, Socrates; Aristotle’s existent works are treatises that are thought to be works not intended for publication in his life, but created as lectures or aids for his students.  A strong similarity between the two, however, is their equal breadth of investigation:

II) On His Works:

Aristotle has treatises (their English translations comprise about 2,450 pages and the works no longer existent are thought to be numerous) on everything from rhetoric and logic to poetry, political organization to zoology (he is the father of plant and animal taxonomy), on the soul, physics, reality, and ethics, and more.  His corpus is divided into five categories: 1) those works known as the “Organon” (“Instrument”) because they dealt with logic in a broad sense, considered to be an instrument or tool of philosophical thinking and not a discipline itself with its own subject matter; 2) those works that address Natural philosophy; 3) those works that address “First Philosophy,” or metaphysics (the study of being and reality); 4) those works that address “Practical Philosophy,” that is, dealing with action, rather than production; and 5) those works that address production, rather than action, which includes rhetoric and poetics.  His ethical philosophy is contained in three treatises that share some overlap of books and are variously thought to be either student notes on Aristotle’s lectures or his writing then edited by students, thus the Nicomachean Ethics should be regarded as authentically Aristotle’s ethical theory, but not in an exact form he may have intended (e.g. the division into books was likely a later editorial insertion and their order may be someone else’s as well; also, subtitles of books in the Hackett edition added by the translator, Terence Irwin).

III) On his Influence:

His influence is fundamental throughout our civilization’s intellectual yield:

Political:  Aristotle had been Alexander the Great’s tutor and his influence can be seen historically during his reign and deduced from Aristotle’s retreat from Athens after the death of Alexander, responding to the rise in rebellious feelings (Aristotle is said to have said, upon his final departure from Athens, that he would not let the Athenians sin twice against philosophy, referencing Socrates’ trial and subsequent death).  Philosophically, while his political theory (his treatise the Politics and his Nicomachean Ethics, which was named as political science and prescribes the study matter for the polis, the city-state) had neither immediate, direct political impact (mainly because he defended the Greek city-state, which was fading from favor during his time) nor much direct modern relevance (due to different political organization and some objectionable defenses), it has had a profound influence throughout history and today for its investigation of perennial political issues, including the relation of individuals to the state, the influence of human nature on politics, the role of morality, justice, and the rule of law in the state, and the causes and fixes for change and revolution.

Religious:  Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thought, first heavily influenced by Plato, became almost entirely dependent upon Aristotle after the latter’s “rediscovery” in the 12th c..  In particular, his De Anima defined soul in a way more amenable to the monotheistic system than Plato’s conception and his ethical teleology (therein and in his ethical and political writings) laid the foundation for the moral writings of the leaders of each religion.  (Medieval philosophy refers to him as “The Philosopher.”)

General: Aristotle’s breadth ensures that his influence can be felt widely across the different schools in today’s university, and he, too, had founded a school in Athens towards the end of his life (335 bce) called the Lyceum—in fact, most of his existent treatises today are thought to have been lectures or lecture notes for his students (and, many argue or joke that this accounts for their sometimes dry style, and that his more beautiful works have not survived).  While Plato’s topics of concern were almost as broad as Aristotle’s, the latter is responsible for having established these diverse studies as distinct sciences with identifiable aims and limits, be it the founding of logic to biology’s system of classification, etc..  While the early modern philosopher Descartes is said to have been the last nail in the coffin of Scholasticism, the monotheistic adoption of Aristotelian thought taken to its further details, Kant’s critical project hearkens Aristotle once more and rescues him from some baggage of scholasticism, and reintegrates him into continuing philosophical discussion.  Contemporary Continental philosophy’s school of phenomenology, fundamental to the development of existentialism to postmodernism, is equally indebted to Aristotle.

IV) On Aristotle’s Philosophy:

Aristotle is probably most famous for his work the Metaphysics.  He is, in fact, responsible for the name “metaphysics:” what we think of today as meaning the study of reality and being originally meant that it was his text that was shelved above or after the Physics. 

The Physics examines nature, or natural beings, as all that is in motion.  The Metaphysics, on the other hand, examines being itself; he opens this work with the famous line “all men by nature desire to know.” 

The goal of the Metaphysics is comprehensive (not certain) knowledge about what it is to be.  For Aristotle, to be is to be something.  And things are composed of form (shape) and matter (material).  (Everything has four causes: material cause (e.g., marble), formal cause (e.g., horse-shape), efficient cause (e.g. sculptor), and final cause (e.g., to commemorate a famous horse)).  Both form and matter are crucial to a thing’s existence, but form is its essential nature because it is that which differentiates the thing from something else composed of the same matter (e.g., a rug, a coat, and a curtain are all made from cloth, the same matter, but they are three different things because of the cloth’s form—its size, shape, etc.). 

Existence (if it is), though, is only a first judgment to be made.  After we have decided something exists, we must determine its essence (that it is, ousia) by answering two questions: 1) what is a thing in itself (what is it uniquely)?; 2) what is it that makes it like all these other things?  After these two judgments, we then must determine “on account of what it is,” which means to find its efficient cause (the ‘whodunit’), and “what it is for,” which means to determine the reason for or aim of its being, that is, its final cause (the ‘why’).

Having discovered the being of the thing, this final step, when the “thing” is a human being, involves the investigation into how it behaves with others ethically and politically.

V) Overview of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:

Books I-II: According to Aristotle, all of the different sciences can be divided into three categories based upon their ends/goals and location of their principles:  Theoretical Science: their end is Truth, that is, for the sake of knowing itself with no further end; their principles are in the matters known themselves; they include First Philosophy (metaphysics), natural science, mathematics, etc.; Practical Science: their end is for the sake of doing good, good action; their principles are in us (as the doers); they include ethics and politics; Productive Science: their end is for the sake of good making, good products; their principles are in us (as the makers); they include rhetoric and poetics.

Thus, the purpose of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ethics being a practical science, is to achieve the goal of doing good and having good actions, which means to live the Good Life.  This makes his ethics teleological (telos, ends), that is, a moral theory concerned with ultimate causes and ends.  His ethics are teleological because he understands all things to have characteristic activities or functions that aim at their perfection as a goal or an end.  To seek the good life is the rational animal’s essential function.  Right action leads to human good; wrong action leads away from true good.  Thus, ethics is concerned with the discernment and accumulation and practice of actions conducive to human good. 

Amongst all things that may be called good, happiness (Grk: Eudaimonia) is the ultimate human good because we want it for its own sake.  Thus, happiness, as the ultimate human good, is the activity of the [human] soul in accordance with complete virtue in a complete life.  And, if Eudaimonia is the ultimate end, then it is also the first principle for ethics (the goal and the starting point/foundation). 

Books III-VI: Happiness, the good that will ensure a good life, requires the appropriate abilities, which are virtues—there are virtues of character, which are required to attain happiness and must be habituated, and virtues of intellect, which are required to sustain happiness and must be taught.  The preconditions for the attainment of any of these virtues necessitates voluntary action and responsibility.

The virtue of character are the states of human beings that secure their happiness and include bravery, temperance, intemperance; generosity, magnificence, magnanimity, small honors, mildness, friendliness, truthfulness, wit, shame; and finally, justice. 

The virtues of intellect/thought concern the ability and disposition to choose the mean between extremes and include Practical Wisdom (Phronesis), Mind (Nous), Knowledge (Episteme), and Wisdom (Sofia).  Of these, Practical Wisdom (Phronesis) is essential; it is the knowledge of how to secure the ends of life, the virtue that gets one happiness, and is perfection of the activity of discerning the good. 

Book VII: Since Aristotle rejects hedonism and asceticism, he discusses Incontinence (Grk: Akrasia: unrestraint or passion overwhelming reason; not a character virtue; he is in dialogue with Plato and Socrates, who argued that one always desires the good and never acts contrary) and Pleasure (which is good and not the bestiality and other perversions of unrestraint).  Books VIII-IX: Which leads into the discussion of Friendship, its three kinds (Utility, Pleasure, and Virtuous) and its relationship to the self. 

Book X: Then returns to the topic of Pleasure and Happiness for a discussion of the right approach to happiness, how pleasure is a good but not the good, and how pleasures differ in kind, which links them with theoretical study.  Aristotle concludes with a discussion on the interrelations of ethics, moral education, and politics.

6. VI)Terminology in (or about) the Nicomachean Ethics:
   

(will be supplemented)

Teleology:  telos, ends.  The branch of philosophy that deals with ends and causes.  The explanation of phenomena by their purpose (final cause: the what for or why), rather than their origin.  In regards to ethics, a moral theory concerned with ultimate causes and ends.  (In theology: the doctrine of design and purpose in the created, material world.)

Happiness:  Eudaimonia, happiness, flourishing.  Activity of the soul in accordance with virtue (that is pleasant, continuous, self-sufficient, and pursued for its own sake).  Involves actualization of highest capacity: reason (logos).  It is the highest goal to which all action aims.

Virtue:  Aretê, virtue, excellence.  State of character (concerned with choice determined by rational principles) to which we can hold the individual responsible. 

Character Virtue:  (aka Moral Virtue) Habituated; a disposition to choose; includes: Bravery, Temperance, Generosity, Magnificence, Magnanimity, Small Honors, Mildness, Friendliness, Truthfulness, Wit, Shame, and Justice.

Intellectual Virtue: (aka Virtue of Thought) Taught; includes: Practical Wisdom (Phronesis), Comprehension (Nous), Knowledge (Episteme), Philosophical Wisdom (Sofia).

Incontinence:  Akrasia (a, without + kratos, power).  Not a character virtue, it is rather conflict from desire for pleasure seeming to have the power to overcome our reasoning about the right choice; when we do bad even when we know it is not the good.

Friendship:  Three types:

1. Utility:  friendship lasts as long as the utility lasts.
   

2. Pleasure:  friendship lasts as long as the pleasure is reciprocated and forthcoming.
   

3. Virtuous:  (Complete Friendship), between similarly virtuous people because of their goodness, friendship for the sake of virtue, fosters and pushes virtue, pleasant and useful, but not solely so.
   

VII) Textual Analysis: The Nicomachean Ethics:

Book I:

Summation: Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics introduces us to happiness as the ultimate human good—it is the highest of all goods and requires virtue (both intellectual and character virtue) to achieve it. 

Contents: Book I: Happiness

Ch. 1: Ends and Goods         

Ch. 2: The Highest Good and Political Science

Ch. 3: The Method of Political Science          

Ch. 4: Common Beliefs         

Ch. 5: The Three Lives         

Ch. 6: The Platonic Form of the Good         

Ch. 7: An Account of the Human Good

Ch. 8: Defense of the Account of the Good

Ch. 9: How is Happiness Achieved?

Ch. 10: Can we be Happy during our Lifetime?

Ch. 11: How Happiness can be Affected after Death

Ch. 12: Praise and Honor

Ch. 13: Introduction to the Virtues

According to Aristotle, all of the different sciences can be divided into three categories based upon their ends/goals and location of their principles:

Theoretical Science: their end is Truth, that is, for the sake of knowing itself with no further end; their principles are in the matters known themselves; they include First Philosophy (metaphysics), natural science, mathematics, etc.;

Practical Science: their end is for the sake of doing good, good action; their principles are in us (as the doers); they include ethics and politics;

Productive Science: their end is for the sake of good making, good products; their principles are in us (as the makers); they include rhetoric and poetics.

Ethics, for Aristotle, is a practical science—aim: to live the Good Life; principles: natural tendencies.

He also calls it a political science—(polis, city-state) which studies the overall good for the city and for the individual (ch.2).  In chapter 9, he clarifies that political science aims at the best good, and seeks to secure it through education of character (so as to permit/promote activity in accord with virtue, as opposed to good happening by chance). 

Thus, these differentiations and distinctions prescribe a plan for this first book: A) we must figure out what is good, B) determine the greatest good (checking along the way to see that our determination agrees with common understanding and to distinguish it from Plato’s idea of the good), C) give its full account (and defend it), D) investigate how we achieve it (and when), and then introduce the virtues.

A) What is good?

Everything—be it a craft, a line of inquiry, an action, or a decision—seems to seek some good, Aristotle tells us, and this seems to support the common definition of “good” as that which all things seek (he is referencing Eudoxus, but equally goes back to Plato’s definition that the Good is that which all things desire).  But, the difficulty here is that there seem to be many goods, thus nothing to make them an universal good:

-The doctor and nurse aim for the good of health,

-The sailor aims for the good of a safe voyage,

-The thief aims for the good of a big heist, as does the economy aim for wealth,

What other goods can we come up with???

Notice his method here: he is beginning in the empirical—the ‘everyday’ or ‘real world,’ with conclusions, actual moral judgments about the good—and works through rational argumentation back to the theoretical, general principles (the opposite would be, for example, a math teacher giving you the principle “addition is the process of combining according to rules to yield a total sum,” with which you then plug in numbers to get various examples of addition).  In the same manner by which we can think each specific good out to a more fundamental aim, we can think the more fundamental aims out to a singular, most fundamental aim, that is, the highest good. 

Aristotle, however, quickly and rationally argues that we can subordinate some lesser goods under better goods because some of these ends are really just means to a bigger end, for example, the medicine a nurse gives aims to reduce fever, but this aim is really to promote health. 

Can we subordinate any goods on our list under some others?

B) How, then does he identify The (Greatest) Good?

Aristotle has to find the end that we desire for its own sake and for the sake of which we desire all other subordinate ends or goods, then this ultimate good will be the end of all ends, the best good, in fact, the good (the summum bonum).

What is The Good?  Amongst all things that may be called good, Happiness (Grk: Eudaimonia) is the ultimate human good because we want it for its own sake.  Thus, happiness, as the ultimate human good, is the activity of the [human] soul in accordance with complete virtue in a complete life.  And, if happiness is the ultimate end, then it is also the first principle for ethics (the goal and the foundation). 

Oh … But what is Happiness? 

It seems that people determine happiness dependent upon the lives they lead.

There seem to be three types of lives:

(1) Life of gratification

(2) Life of political activity

(3) Life of study

     [(4) Life of moneymaker—but, no, wealth only useful for some other end]

What is happiness for each life?

(1) pleasure (2) honor or virtue (3) says we’ll study it later [(4) wealth]

Are any of these the greatest good?  Not 1, 2, or 4. 

Why?  (1) slavish, (2) superficial or incomplete, (3) unknown, (4) a means, not end.

How is the Greatest Good that we are seeking not Plato’s Good?

To understand Plato’s Good, we must understand his Theory of the Forms. {Click here for information on the Forms}

Aristotle’s 11-Part Argument against the Forms:

a) There is no universal for an ordered series (§2).

b) There is no universal good across the categories (§3).

c) There is no single Form/Idea across different sciences (§4).

d) The Platonic Form of the Good is useless for understanding goodness (§5).

e) The eternity of the Form is irrelevant (§6).

f) [Even] The Pythagorian view is more plausible than the Platonic view (§7).

g) There is no Form/Idea even for intrinsic goods (§8-11).

h) Goods don’t have same names by chance, but their connections don’t necessitate Forms/Ideas (§12).

i) Forms have no bearing on action (§13).

j) The sciences do not refer to the Form (§§14-15).

k) The Form does not help the practice of the sciences (§16).

The essence of his critique has two parts:

One) a warning to avoid reduction of diversity down to a universality—e.g., we don’t have a Form ‘number’ for all the different numbers, just as there are many goods spoken of in different ways and many sciences, and not a single, over-arching form of good.

Two) ethics is a practical science; happiness is about activity; the Form Good has no bearing on the practice of science or the activity of living.

C) A Full Account of Happiness (and defense):

Aristotle lays out the framework thus far for the good and some requirements for its being the greatest:

The ultimate human end is the good (§1);

It is complete (§§2-5);

It is self-sufficient (§§6-7);

It is the most choice-worthy (it is not one good among others) (§8).

Happiness fits all of these criteria: it is complete, self-sufficient, and most choice-worthy.

But, we must be more clear—we need to “grasp the function of the human being” (§10, 1097b25).

The Function Argument:

All things have a function (ergon).

What are some functions of things? 

Thing:Function:Perfection of function:

Knifeto cutsharpness, strong metal, etc.

Eyeto seekeen vision, etc.

Plantto grow/reproducebest arrangement of parts to take in nutrition, etc.

Doorto let in/keep outgood hinges, easy movability or fixity

Harpistto play the harpto play the harp well

Human Function: activity of soul in accord w/ reason

1. Perfection of Function: to do this well -i.e., in accord w/ complete virtue
   

2. (need a special, unique function—reason)
   

The defense of this is to show how it accords with what  is commonly thought (in essence):

Both common and our theory make goods of soul better than external or bodily goods;

Both show the happy person lives and does well;

Both have features (esp. virtue, prudence, wisdom, pleasure, prosperity) of happiness, more or less;

Both have life of such active/virtuous/happy people as pleasant life (needs no extra pleasure added).

So …

D) How do we Achieve it (and when), and then Introduce the Virtues:

“Is happiness acquired by learning, or habituation, or by some other form of cultivation?  Or is it the result of some divine fate, or even of fortune?” (§1, 1099b9-11).

If a gift of the gods: happiness is the best good, thus would be their gift (but, this question suitable for a different study).

If results from virtue and learning or cultivation: most divine things since its goal is the best good and would be widely shared (since anyone capable of virtue will be able to achieve happiness through some sort of learning and/or attention)—thus, this is the best way to achieve happiness (rather than through fortune). 

And, this agrees with our definition of happiness (i.e.: a certain sort of activity of the soul in accord with virtue) (because it demands activity, not mere luck) and it agrees with the goal of political science to be the best good and its focus on character, making people good by their doing fine actions (“Since political science aims at the best good, and seeks to secure it through education of character, its practice presupposes that happiness consists primarily in character and action, not in fortune” –Irwin, notes, 188 (re:§8)) (§§2-8). 

In accordance, animals and children are not happy because their actions aren’t directed in accord with virtue (§§9-10).  Happiness needs a complete life because many misfortunes can befall us (§11).

But, of course, we need some good luck to have external circumstances that permit us to act in accordance with reason and virtue to be happy.

In summary: “Happiness consists in our activities, not in good luck, but it depends on luck and external circumstances” –Irwin, notes, 187.

When?  During our lives, although things after death may have a slight impact on it.

Thus… because our definition of happiness (activity of the soul in accord with complete virtue), we must study virtue to better understand happiness. 

Virtue—human virtue—is virtue of the soul.

Click HERE for a schema of the three conceptions of soul.

The Soul has three parts, two nonrational, one rational:

1. The nonrational part (the nutritive) that functions without our awareness is irrelevant to ethics, which requires our awareness. 
   

2. The nonrational part that includes desire can agree or disagree with the rational part, thus, this part requires different types of virtue than those types of virtue required for the rational part of the soul.
   

3. The rational part of the soul.
   

Thus, there are two types of virtues: Virtues of Thought (wisdom, comprehension, prudence) & Virtues of Character (generosity, temperance)

Book II:

Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics introduces us to happiness as the ultimate human good—it is the highest of all goods and requires virtue (both intellectual and character virtue) to achieve it.  Book II, then, is of utter importance to the whole of the Ethics because we are going to learn how we acquire virtue (focusing on character virtue until Bk VI), the prerequisite for happiness.  Since virtue controls happiness, we must know what the relevant virtues are by which to secure happiness and how to achieve them.  This is the heart of Book II.

More specifically, there are nine chapters within the second book of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.  (1) They begin by (re-)distinguishing the two types of virtue (intellectual and character virtue) and then focus upon the latter, character virtue.  Aristotle then proceeds to delineate how a character virtue is acquired (through habituation), (2) elaborates upon habituation, (3) notes the importance of pleasure and pain therein, (4) differentiates action and character, (5-6) identifies its genus and differentia (species), (7) notes the particular character virtues, (8) carefully differentiates the mean and extremes, and (9) encourages us as to how we achieve the mean.

Chapters 1 and 2:

What is virtue?  Well, first we distinguish the two types of virtue:

Intellectual Virtue:  Learned through education, takes time and experience.

Character Virtue: Learned through habituation [character virtue: ēthos; habit: ethos]. 

We will focus on character virtue until Book VI.

So, what is character virtue?

Character Virtue is neither a matter of nature (instinct) nor is it contrary to nature. 

A person cannot train a stone, whose nature is to fall downward, to fall upwards, no matter the repetition of training—so, while we are not inherently good or evil, it is natural for us to do things that bring us pleasure, good things, thus, to practice virtue.

How do we acquire character virtue?

We have within us a potentiality for being virtuous; we actualize this potentiality by action. Our potentiality for being virtuous is the exercise of our capacity for doing virtuous things.

We acquire virtues by repeatedly doing right actions—eventually we learn that these right actions must express right attitudes and that we exercise them until that time in which we have acquired a permanent disposition, that is, the habit for virtue (habit: hexis in the Greek and habitus in the Latin), such that we come to enjoy acting rightly—it gives us pleasure. 

Aristotle likens our acquisition of virtue to that of a craft  (although refines this analogy later)—

We have the potentiality to sew, we actualize our potentiality by actually sewing, we become seamstresses by developing our capacities, just repeating the production until we become skilled at it.  In analogy, thus, we become just by doing just things; we become temperate by doing temperate things; we become brave by doing brave things.  Virtue, then, is a matter of the habituation of right actions until they become permanent habits. 

We can also think, for example, of muscle memory: whether it is playing baseball or piano, you have to train your body to do what will eventually become natural; with practice, you can become great at this and enjoy it (get pleasure from it) for both itself and your success at it … likewise with virtue!

But … Just as we habituate virtue, habituation can ruin virtue (1103b6).  Again, recall muscle memory, you can learn bad posture as well as good. 

If this weren’t the case, we would have no need for teachers—people would be born good or bad or we would only need people with self-discipline to self-habituate.  But, since we must learn what is good and can habituate badness, we need teachers to school us in the good that is to be then habituated.

It is the same with virtues.  We can habituate fear as easily as bravery (matters of character virtue), gluttonous behavior as easily as temperance (matters of desire and appetite), etc.:

Education is key:  “To sum it up in a single account: a state [of character] results from [the repetition of] similar activities.  That is why we must perform the right activities, since differences in these imply corresponding differences in the states.  It is not unimportant, then, to acquire one sort of habit or another, right from our youth.  On the contrary, it is very important, indeed all-important” (trans. Irwin, 1103b20-25).

Yet… The key for character virtue is not just knowing virtue, but becoming virtuous

But… “… actions should accord with the correct reason” (1103b30).

The most important key throughout here is to recognize that virtuous states tend to be ruined by excess and deficiency. 

Aristotle cites strength, health, eating, and drinking as examples (1104a12)—i.e., to be strong, one must exercise, but too much exercise and one becomes like a certain now ex-Californian governor, hardly a model of human strength; one must eat to be healthy, but eating too much and one becomes health’s opposite; or, as they say, a little red wine and coffee are good for you, too much: you become a wino or caffeine addict, and thus, hardly healthy, etc. 

The same is true of all character virtues, e.g.: bravery, temperance, etc.  To be brave, one must have a little fearfulness and a little recklessness—a touch of each extreme in some degree of balance—as we will see, not a perfect mean, but an approximate one. 

Once we have acquired character virtues, their continued exercise perpetuate the virtues (doing the virtue is to be virtuous)—e.g., abstaining from hedonistic pleasure habituates temperance, once we are temperate, our temperance permits us to abstain from hedonistic pleasure.    {an almost cyclical reinforcement, do X to get Y, having gotten Y, you can do X.}

This is why, in Chapter 3:  he speaks of   The Importance of Pleasure and Pain

“… virtue of character is about pleasures and pains” (trans. Irwin, 1104b5).

Pleasure and pain impinge in various ways upon virtue. 

-- they encourage and dissuade, these can be for or against virtue.

-- the correct acquisition of virtue results in pleasure.

The consequent feeling of pleasure or pain, then, signals one’s state of virtue

—if after the action, one feels/shows pleasure, then the action was enjoyed, then the enactment of the action was done virtuously; if one is in pain (regret, unhappiness, etc.) after the action, it was not done from within the state of having/being that character virtue.  For example: if one abstains from having a smoke/drink/etc., then feels good that one withstood the temptation to have one, then one is temperate; if the abstinence brings unpleasant feelings, one is still in the process of habituation (well or not) the virtue of temperance. 

Thus (chapter 4) … a virtue is determined not only by the properties of its result (was the excessive temptation resisted, etc.), but also by the state of the doer of the deed. 

The agent must: (1) know she is doing the virtuous action, (2) she must decide upon the virtue, and for its own good, and (3) she must also do them from a firm and unchanging state. 

[For a craft, you need only the knowing, e.g., shipbuilding—for a virtue, the knowing is nothing really, without the deciding and acting upon it; we achieve these latter two states by frequent doing of the action, the practice that produces habituation.]

“Hence actions are called just or temperate when they are the sort that a just and temperate person would do.  But the just and temperate person is not the one who [merely] does these actions, but the one who also does them in the way in which just or temperate people do them” (trans. Irwin, 1105b5).  –for example, resisting a vice because you lock yourself in a cage doesn’t mean you are temperate.

Chapters 5, 6, & 7 identify the genus and species broadly then concretely of virtue.

The genus of virtue—i.e., what is virtue, in and of itself?—is one of the three conditions in the soul: feelings, capacities, and states—Ultimately, he decides the genus of virtue is our state of being.

Chapter 6:    Virtue of Character: Its Differentia

So, virtue is a state, but what sort of state?

“… every virtue causes its possessors to be in a good state and to perform their functions well” (trans. Irwin, 1106a15).  So—Virtue makes the state and performance of one’s function excellent. 

The virtue of the eyes is to see; the excellent functioning of the eyes is to see well; thus, to see well is the fulfillment of the function of the eyes and their virtue—will hold in all cases.

The virtue of the human being will be the state that makes a human being good and makes him perform his function well. 

This will be clear if we consider What is the sort of nature had by virtue?:

In something continuous and divisible, we can take more or less or equal parts; the equal division is some intermediate between extremes, that is, between excess and deficiency.

Numerically, 6 is always the mean between 2 and 10.  For ethics, the mean is relative.

Aristotle’s example: if a trainer decides that ten pounds of food is too much and two is too few, he, still, will not prescribe every client to take six pounds of food, for six pounds may also be too much or too little depending upon that client. 

Likewise, for virtue, we must choose the intermediate between excess and deficiency relative to us that promotes virtue.  Thus, we must have the right “… feelings [or actions] at the right times, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, [this] is the intermediate and best condition, and this is proper to virtue” (trans. Irwin, 1106b20). 

“Virtue, then, is a mean, insofar as it aims at what is intermediate” (trans. Irwin, 1106b25).

This is certainly tough—there are many ways to be incorrect and one way in which to be correct, thus it is far easier to be bad, than good—although not impossible!

–Thus, despite the relativity, we can legitimately, validly judge virtue from vice because the mean is defined by reference to reason (1107a1).

Chapter 7:     The Particular Virtues of Character

Okay, so!  Now Aristotle reminds us that we cannot just state the general account, but now must apply it to particular cases.  (Note the pedagogic rigor of his argumentation!)—But … this is also just a schema that will be filled out at length starting half way through Bk III …

He closes Book II with two more chapters: 

Chapter 8:   Relations between Mean and Extreme States

The excess and deficiency are contraries just as they are each contrary to the means.  People will attempt to persuade the intermediate by calling it (as its contrary) its extreme (e.g., the coward will call the brave rash—both bravery and rashness are contraries to cowardice, but the coward ignores the internal opposition between the mean and excess).

Chapter 9:    How can we Reach the Mean?

It is hard work to reach excellence. 

To reach the mean, one must avoid the extremes; the second best option is to tend towards the lesser of the two evils.  We must also self-reflect and determine what it is that we naturally drift towards and we need to know our own tendencies in order to correct our course.  And, we must always be aware (that is, beware) of pleasure and its sources.  We are naturally biased to pleasure, and this bias keeps us from unbiased judging if it really is good or not.  Following this advice, we will always keep towards the intermediate; but, this is hard to follow and some deviation from the perfect mean is normal and allowable. 

Book III:           Pre-Conditions of Virtue

Book III explores the preconditions of virtue by exploring: (1) Voluntary and Involuntary Actions, (2) Decision, (3) Deliberation, (4) Wish, and how (5) Virtue and Vice are in Our Power, before moving on (6-12) to a close study of the first two individual character virtues: Bravery and Temperance. 

Chapter 1) Voluntary and Involuntary Actions

Virtue is about feelings and actions; they receive praise or blame if they are voluntary; they receive pardon and sometimes pity if they are involuntary.  Thus, to fully examine virtue, we must examine the voluntary and involuntary.

Involuntary:  Things come about by force or ignorance—things forced have their own external principle(s) to which the agent/victim contributes nothing.

Voluntary:  Things that come about by the principle of the agent’s own action (i.e., principle in agent who also knows the particulars that constitute the action, 1111a23).

But, what about fear? 

If a tyrant orders you to do something shameful and will kill your family if you disobey, is your obedience voluntary or involuntary?

If you throw cargo overboard during a storm, it is sensible to do so to save lives, but insensible action if lives are not as risk; is your action a voluntary, welcome choice or involuntary, unwelcome choice?

Thus, there are also those actions that are Mixed:  Actions may be voluntary, he explains, in that the person (insofar as the principle of action is in the person) does them, but they are also involuntary in that the person would not choose to do so the action in its own right (1110a15).

Chapter 2)    Decision

Decision—that which is most proper to virtue and distinguishes characters better than actions:

--It is apparently voluntary, but less voluntary than the widest definition of voluntary

(it is voluntary, but not everything that is voluntary is decided; i.e., animals and children as well as spur-of-the-moment actions share in voluntary action, but not decision). 

--It is not appetite or spirit or wish or some sort of belief. 

-----Not Appetite b/c: shared w/ nonrational; appetite’s object = pleasure or pain; decision’s object ≠ pleasure or pain.

-----Not Spirit b/c: shared w/ nonrational; actions caused by spirit ≠ actions caused by decision.

-----Not Wish b/c: can wish for impossible, cannot decide on impossible (foolish); wish for things beyond agency, cannot decide what’s beyond our agency; wish for end, decide on means to promote end.

-----Not Belief b/c: belief about everything, decision about what we can control; belief is true or false, decision is right or wrong.

--It involves reason and thought (thus, it is not shared with the nonrational).

--It is (as the etymology of its name shows) what is chosen before other things:

prohaireton, what is decided, is haireon, chosen, pro, before other things. 

Chapter 3)    Deliberation

We deliberate about what is up to us—what we can do (the “we” not being madmen). 

We do not deliberate on: (1) external things (e.g., universe, principles of math or physics or nature or fortune); (2) all human affairs (but only those with impact on us and on which we have impact); and (3) exact and self-sufficient sciences — because “… none of these results could be achieved through our agency” (1112a30).

We do deliberate about (1) what comes about from our agency and (2) can happen in different ways on different occasions; (3) when we are uncertain about outcomes and (4) when such are undefined. 

We don’t deliberate about ends, but about (5) means—what promotes ends.

(e.g., a doctor does not deliberate about whether he cures, but about which cure, an orator does not deliberate about whether he will persuade, but, rather, how he will do so, etc.).  “Rather, we lay down the end, and then examine the ways and means to achieve it” (trans. Irwin, 1112b15).  If several ways may reach the end, we deliberate about which will do so best, etc. 

“… all deliberation is inquiry, but not all inquiry—in mathematics, for instance—is deliberation” (trans. Irwin, 1112b20).

If a human being is a principle of action, as determined already, then deliberation is about the actions of which he is capable.  They are for the sake of other things, not themselves in and of themselves—i.e., means, not ends. 

Decision, then, is deliberative desire (we deliberate, that which we settle on is that which we desire, our decision, then is that of which we have deliberated and desire). 

Chapter 4) Wish(Counter Plato)

Wish is for the end.  Some think it is for the good; others think it is for the apparent good.

Those who think the good is wished:  it follows that what someone wishes, if he chooses incorrectly, is not wished for at all—e.g., if wished=good, yet wished turns out to be bad, the wished for is good and bad at once, thus contradiction. 

Those who think the apparent good is wished:  it follows that nothing is wished by nature; each person wishes what seems good to him, different things can be wished for, even contradictory things, by different people without logical contradiction. 

Both have problems, thus for Aristotle: in general, we wish the good, but each person wishes the apparent good.  Thus, the excellent person successfully wishes the good by actually wishing what is good, whereas the base person mistakes the good and thus only wishes for their apparent, but ultimately incorrect, good. 

Chapter 5)   Virtue and Vice are in Our Power

“We have found, then, that we wish for the end, and deliberate and decide about things that promote it; hence the actions concerned with things that promote the end are in accord with decision and are voluntary.  The activities of the virtues are concerned with these things [that promote the end]” (trans. Irwin, 1113b5).

This determines, then, that virtue is up to us, as is vice.  If we can choose virtue, it logically follows that we could also choose vice.  Being good or bad, decent or base, is up to us.  This is true for citizens as well as legislating bodies.  This holds for vices of the soul and of the body. 

This designation of responsibility justifies and enforces why we seek to encourage virtue and to correct vice. 

After Chapter 5, Aristotle moves on to discussions of each of the character virtues.  Bravery and Temperance are the first two (the rest in Books IV-V).

Chapter 6) Bravery {Courage}: Its Scope

Bravery: the mean between the feelings of fear and confidence. 

Fear: object: what is frightening; we fear all bad things, but not all bad things concern bravery (and fearlessness of all things is not then brave).  The most fearful things—namely, death—likewise do not always concern bravery (e.g. death at sea or from sickness is not concern for brave person).  The most fearful things—namely death—concern the brave person in the finest condition of the object of fear—namely, death in war, since it invokes greatest and finest death.  (This is attested to by the greatest honors being given in its name.) 

“Hence someone is called fully brave if he is intrepid in facing a fine death and the immediate dangers that bring death” (1115a33-6).  “Moreover, we act like brave men on occasions when we can use our strength, or when it is fine to be killed …” (1115b4-6).

Chapter 7) Bravery: Its Characteristic Outlook

What is frightening is not the same for everyone.  Some things are too frightening for humans; these are frightening for all humans.  What is less frightening is such in differing degrees, as is what is inspirational to confidence.

“The brave person is unperturbed, as far as a human being can be.  Hence, though he will fear even the sorts of things that are not irresistible, he will stand firm against them, in the right way, as reason prescribes, for the sake of the fine, since this is the end aimed at by virtue” (1115b11-13).

“Hence whoever stands firm against the right things and fears the right things, for the right end, in the right way, at the right time, and is correspondingly confident, is the brave person; for the brave person’s actions and feelings accord with what something is worth, and follow what reason prescribes” (1115b16-19).

“Every activity aims at actions in accord with the state of character” (1115b20).—thus, one’s character is determinant of one’s chosen actions.  To the brave person, bravery is fine.  Its end (the brave act) is also fine.  The brave person aims at the fine (the end, the brave act) by standing firm and acting in accordance with bravery.

The deficiency of bravery is fearfulness; its (the deficiency’s) excess is nameless (i.e., we have no separate name for excessive fearfulness).  The excess of confidence is rashness.  The deficiency of confidence is cowardliness.  The coward, rash, and brave person are all concerned with the same things, but have different states related to them—a deficiency, an excess, and only the brave has the intermediate between the two: it is the mean.

Chapter 8) Conditions that Resemble Bravery

There are five states similar to (but are not) bravery:

1) bravery of citizens

they stand firm against danger, but to avoid reproach and earn honor (brave does it b/c it is the fine thing to do, not by any compulsion.

2) experience

e.g. professional soldiers seem brave b/c they know what to expect; but, aren’t b/c when expectations exceeded, they run, whereas the brave do not.

3) spirit

animalistic spirit looks like bravery, but is done b/c of pain (wound or fright); brave does for pleasure of the fine end.

4) hopefulness

hopefulness is those who are confident b/c of past victories; when victory seems unsecured, they run whereas the truly brave do not.

5) knowledge or ignorance

those with knowledge seem brave b/c they are better prepared, but run when not, unlike truly brave; those who are ignorant don’t know what to expect, thus lack self-esteem that comes from making a choice knowing the possibilities, unlike truly brave, who choose and stand firm.

Chapter 9) Feelings Proper to Bravery

Bravery is about feelings of confidence and fear—but not equally so.  The brave are more fearful of frightening things than s/he is overly confident.

Bravery is standing firm against what is painful—it is justly praised because it is harder to stand against painfulness than it is to refrain from the pleasurable, although the end of bravery is pleasant to some degree, albeit the pleasure is obscured by the trials required to achieve it.  The end is fine, and failing the end is shameful, even if the trial is more painful than not.

Chapter 10) Temperance: Its Scope

Temperance and Bravery are both virtues concerned with the nonrational parts.

Temperance is a mean concerned with pleasures; it is less concerned and concerned in a different way with pains.  Its opposite is Intemperance. 

Distinguish pleasures:

Pleasures of the Soul: e.g., love of honor, love of learning, etc.  these are neither called temperate or intemperate. 

Pleasures of the Body: some can be called temperate or intemperate, but not all bodily pleasures—you do not temperately or intemperately enjoy color, sound, or smells; you can temperately or intemperately enjoy touch and taste, but not all touch and taste, but that which is enjoyed for gratification (e.g., eating, drinking, and sex for gratification of pleasure alone).

These are slavish and bestial; their opposite is civilized pleasures.

Chapter 11) Temperance: Its Outlook

Some appetites (the natural) are shared by all; some are distinctive (different for different people).  Natural appetites (eating for nourishment; or sex for youth, according to Homer) are shared by all; but not all have appetites for the same sort of food, drink, or sex, etc., thus these types of appetites seem distinctive to each of us.

The error in natural appetite is only to the excess—this is gluttony. 

The errors in distinctive appetites are many and diverse—the excess of pleasure is intemperance; the excess of pain is not really sensible.  One is intemperate when they have an excessive appetite for pleasure at the cost of all other things. 

The deficiency of pleasure is uncommon and insensible and not really human, therefore nameless. 

The temperate person, then, achieves the medium in relation to bodily pleasures.

S/he finds no pleasure in the intemperate’s pleasures, but finds this disagreeable.

S/he finds no pleasure in wrong things.

S/he finds no intense pleasure in bodily things (if finds pleasure here, it is moderate).

S/he suffers no pain at the absence of bodily pleasures.

S/he feels moderate pleasure in things concerning health and fitness.

S/he does not deviate from the fine or exceed his/her means.

S/he likes things fine in accord with correct reason.

Chapter 12) Intemperance

Intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice because it is caused by pleasure, which is choice-worthy, whereas cowardice is caused by pain, which is to be avoided.  Pain disturbs and ruins the nature of the sufferer; pleasure does not.  Thus, intemperance is more voluntary and thus more open to reproach.  (Cowardice in general, while less voluntary than intemperance, is more voluntary than some of its particular acts, which are involuntary.)

Errors of children we can call intemperate—but, these are a species of intemperance in general.  Inappropriate appetites and inappropriate childish actions both must be tempered; both things desire the shameful and “tend to grow large” (119b1—is Aristotle making a joke here, we wonder?).  Thus, we must temper and subordinate children and appetites under the proper rule (that is, reason), or else they will go astray.  “Hence the temperate person’s appetitive part must agree with reason; for both [his appetite part and his reason] aim at the fine, and the temperate person’s appetites are for the right things, in the right ways, at the right times, which is just what reason prescribes” (1119b17-20).

Book IV:         

A brief overview of the various virtues:

Generosity [Liberality]

Between: Giving Money & Taking Money (esp. giving)

Excess: Wastefulness Vicious

Deficiency: Ungenerosity Ungenerosity (misers)

Wastefulness is a self-destruction; praise goes more to person who gives rightfully; they are beneficial people; they give rightly and with pleasure; acquire and give wealth from right sources; will not neglect his own possessions, since one seeks them to be able to give them; generosity depends on what, not how much, and state of character from which one gives; those who inherit tend to more generosity than those who worked for it, due to their not knowing shortage; hard for the generous to grow rich; being wasteful is better than being ungenerous.  The deficient in generosity tend to a shameful love of gain.  Those who excessively take can be on  large-scale (tyrants who sack cities) or small-scale (gamblers, robbers). 

Magnificence [Large scale expenses]

Between: Giving Money & Taking Money

Excess: Vulgarity (poor taste, ostentatious)

Deficiency: Stinginess

Concerns money, like for generosity, but only in regards to large-scale actions.  It is one who spends a worthy amount on a large (not trivial) purpose, that is, the right thing; like a scientist, one determines the fitting amount; e.g., expenses for gods (dedications, sacrifices, temples) and that provoke good competition for honor for the common good (chorus, warship, feast for city).  Fitting for the magnificent to spend well on occasions that are personal and benefit whole, but also to live well in a suitable house.  The excess spends much on trivial things and shows them off.  The stingy refuse to spend much on what deserves it.

Magnanimity [Great Deeds; Great Honors; greatness of soul; proper pride]

Between: Honor & Dishonor (concerned with great things)

Excess: Vanity / Honor-Lover (foolish)  [errors, not evils]

Deficiency: Pusillanimity (timidity) Indifference  [errors, not evils]

One who correctly deems oneself worthy of great things: the best person, one who is also great in all the virtues (magnanimity is the “adornment” of all the virtues), and has a moderate attitude to result; those who are not worthy of it include the foolish (who think they are), the vain (who think they are); those who are but think themselves not to be are the pusillanimous or timid.  Good fortune can contribute to it.  This person remembers deeds, not rewards, asks little and helps much, and acts rarely but well, is open and truthful, self-determined, not prone to marvel or gossip and avoids gripes; one’s possessions are fine and unproductive (i.e., self-sufficient), and moves slowly, speaks deeply and calmly.

Small Honors [Nameless; Ambition]

Between: Honor & Dishonor  (concerned with proper honor)

Excess: (Honor-Lover)

Deficiency: (disinterest to honor)

Must be concerned with proper honors in right way.

Mildness [Nameless; good temper]

Between: Anger & Indifference

Excess: Irascible (nameless; variants of excess: cantankerous, choleric, bitter, irritable)

Deficiency: Inirascible (nameless; passive, foolish)

The mean inclines to the deficiency.  One who is angry in the right way towards the right things at the right time, and for the right length of time is praised (ends noting how hard it is to say the definitive right answers for any of these right things).

Friendliness [Nameless]

Between: Ingratiating &Cantankerous

Excess: w/o ulterior motive: Ingratiating     w/ ulterior motive: Flattery

Deficiency: Cantankerous, Quarrelsome Ill-temperedness

One who accepts or objects to things when it is right and in the right way.  It differs from friendship because it does not require any special feeling or fondness between people; one does right here because of one’s good character, not because of feeling for another.  Treats others rightly; is properly concerned with the pleasures and pains of/for others in accord with what is suitable for the other.

Truthfulness [Nameless]

Between: Boastfulness & Self-Deprecation

Excess: Boastfulness

Deficiency: Self-Deprecation

The boaster seems to claim, but does not possess, qualities that would win good reputation.  The self-deprecator disavows or belittles actual qualities.  The truthful one is straightforward, acknowledges qualities without aggrandizing or belittling them.  Truthfulness not in relation to justice or injustice (that is different virtue); instead, concerns truth even when nothing is at stake.

Wit [Ready Wittedness, Humor]

Between: Buffonery & Boorishness

Excess: Buffoonery

Deficiency: Boorishness (stiff)

Life includes relaxation (is necessary), so we include a virtue of wit, one who says and listens to the right things in the right way.  This one is also dexterous, saying and listening to what is suitable for the civilized person; will not be indiscriminate in remarks.

Shame [Modesty]*  not a virtue (instead, a feeling), but makes one prone to it

Between:

Excess: ashamed of everything

Deficiency: shameless

Is akin to a feeling of the fear of disrepute.  It is good for youth to acquire it, but is not appropriate for every stage of life.  Disgrace from having done bad actions is not appropriate for the decent person.  Shame concerns what is voluntary and decent person will never willingly do base actions.  It is a sort of a mixed state.

Proper Indignation

Envy & Spite

Pain when all do well

Enjoy others’ misfortunes

Book V:  Justice  

OUTLINE:

I) Varieties: lawless/lawful, overreaching/not overreaching, unfair/fair;

II) General and Specific Justice A) General Justice 1) Form,  B) Special Justice 1) Distribution 2) Rectification i) Voluntary ii) Involuntary a) secret b) forced;

III) Justice in Exchange;

IV) Political Justice A) Freedom & Equality B) Rule of Law C) Society & Family;

V) Justice by Nature & by Law;

VI) Voluntary & Involuntary A) Power to Choose B) Coincidental C) Violations of Justice 1) Errors 2) Wrong Decisions;

VII) Puzzles A) Suffer Injustice Voluntarily? B) Do Injustice to Oneself? 1) Actions not State C) Decency Conflict with Justice? 1) Definition of Decency D) Worse to Do or Suffer Injustice? E) Justice and Injustice in one Individual?

The layout of Aristotle’s discussion of specific character virtues tells us something about them—Bravery and Intemperance come up first (end of Bk III) and are dealt with at greater length and in greater detail than the next eight or nine character virtues (Bk IV), and then the last, Justice, is addressed throughout its own entire book (Bk V).  Bravery and Intemperance, those virtues that most closely concern the non-rationally guided parts of behavior, are two of the most basic and fundamental to being a virtuous person (leaving us open to greater reproach than many of the others), and offer us a model for how the others will work, as well.  Justice is the most important in the opposite regard—it is like the capstone of being a virtuous person because Justice can be conceived generally as having and abiding all of the virtues, as well as specifically as an additional virtue.

Chapter 1) Varieties of Justice

The questions to be examined about justice and injustice:

--Their actions?

--The mean?

--The extremes?

The state of justice is that which makes us just agents (that is, to do and wish just things)—so, a science of justice and study of the capacity of being or not just are entirely different inquiries than ours, on the state of being just or unjust. 

Contraries: if we know what is a good state, we know what is a bad state (e.g., if I know it is good to be temperate, I also know that it is bad to be intemperate).  Further, if we know what states are good and bad, we also likely know things/aspects/attributes that are good and bad, and can also likely know, then, what the good and bad states are productive of (e.g., temperance is a good state, eating what is healthy in a healthy amount is temperate; intemperance is a bad state, eating unhealthy things in unhealthy amounts is intemperate; thus, that which produces temperance must be that which produces eating that is healthy).

Of course, things of such nature are spoken of in many ways—for both sides of the contraries—e.g., temperance can be eating healthy, drinking healthy, exercising healthy, sleeping healthy, etc., just as intemperance can be eating too much, eating the wrong types of things, drinking excessively, taking steroids, sleeping 22 hours a night, etc.—so, we can speak of temperance and intemperance in many ways, that is, we can name many, many species of the genus temperance or intemperance. 

Justice and Injustice are both spoken of in many ways; however, their similarity is close, that is to say, typically, unjust actions are the opposite of just actions (returning lost money is just; its opposite, not returning lost money, is unjust). 

So, how do we typically talk about talk about unjust people? 

--lawless,

--overreaching,

--unfair.

Since just and unjust are so close, we can say we typically talk about just people as:

--lawful,

[--not overreaching—this is more complicated, so doesn’t mention it at first, but will discuss in detail]

--fair.

So… our first clear conclusion: “Hence the just will be both the lawful and what is fair, and the unjust will be both the lawless and the unfair” (1129b1-2).

But, what about that “overreaching” attribute? 

The unjust person does this, the just does not.  What does overreaching mean?  It is clear that it is some sort of excess and it is concerned with goods, he tells us—thus, think about excessively reaching for things … we would call this being greedy, hence, overreaching = greediness.  Now, he goes on to clarify that greediness is not towards everything, and something that one can be greedy about are not bad impulses at all [if you are constantly overreaching so as to bring happiness to as many people as possible, likely we aren’t going to call this a vice or you a bad person!]; but just towards some things is greediness an ethical problem.  Thus, since the goodness or badness of the things is so crucial to determine the goodness or badness of the overreaching, it seems that the best way to further think about this aspect is to subordinate it under the attribute of fairness (or being equitable—e.g., greedily snatching up all the resources is overreaching, is unjust, but it is also more easily talked about as being unfair to others). 

Now, what about that “lawful / lawless” attribute? 

Speaking of having or lacking laws, we see this is going to have to do most clearly with the political, on the institutional and community levels.  If the lawless person is unjust, and the lawful person is just, we can see that that which is lawful is in some way just.  The legislation of what is and isn’t lawful is, then, having to determine what is and isn’t just. 

Let us look at laws.  They can aim to do good for the whole or for those in control.  So, in one way of speaking, we can say that what is just is that which produces and maintains the good, happiness, in the whole and for the parts of a political community. 

Law instructs us to do the actions of:

--the brave person (don’t abandon your post in war, throw away your weapons, etc.);

--the temperate person (don’t commit adultery, or wanton aggression, etc.);

--the mild person (don’t go around kicking others, reviling other, etc.);

--etc. for each and every other character virtue… do the mean, don’t do the extremes…

Correctly established law does this, whereas incorrectly law does not. …

Thus, “This type of justice, then, is complete virtue, not complete virtue without qualification, but complete virtue in relation to another” (1129b26-7—emphasis is mine).

I emphasize “this type of justice” because we can see one way of speaking about justice is that it is the proper doing of all the different character virtues.  So… if you are brave, temperate, generous, magnificent, magnanimous, mild, friendly, truthful, and witty, then you are just; and if all are these things, than the society will be just.  Yes, this is one meaning of justice.  BUT… what Aristotle is getting at is that this is one correct way of talking about justice in general or complete justice, but that this does not capture everything that we mean when we talk about justice.  Making justice just the greatest genus of all character virtues ignores the fact that there are many species of justice that are distinct from being just these character virtues together.  (This is Aristotle’s address/critique of Plato’s idea of Justice, which he elaborates at length in his text The Republic.)

Ch 2) Special Justice Contrasted with General

So, there is justice in general (complete justice), which is the whole of having the character virtues, and there is a type of justice that is a part of virtue.  (Equally, there is injustice in general, and specific injustices.)  So, now let us seek out what is this “special justice” (i.e., special as in specifics).

Evidence that there is a special type of justice other than complete justice:

If someone is cowardly, for example, throws down his/her weapon in war, this is unjust, but not necessarily greedy, since s/he is not trying to take all of something for her/himself and away from others.  When someone is greedy, there are plenty of things s/he may be greedy about that have nothing to do with being cowardly.  Thus, there is one way in which a disobedience of a virtue can have nothing to do with being just or unjust.  But, we will reproach both the coward and the greedy one for doing something wrong.  His or her disobedience of any of the virtues means that s/he is not being just in the grand sense, which would necessitate him/her to be abiding by all the virtues.  Thus, in this sense, disobedience of any virtue does have to do with justice and injustice.  How it can be both ways (having to do with justice and not having to do with justice) is because we mean two different things by justice—justice has two forms: one is general, one has to do with specifics, and is, thus, more like one more character virtue. 

(We can have further evidence for this because we can also imagine two different people doing the same non-virtuous thing for two entirely different reasons (e.g., A commits adultery to make a profit, and does; B commits adultery due to appetite, and loses money in the process; A, then, is unjust, but not really intemperate; B, then, is intemperate, but not really greedy/unjust)).

Any special type of injustice is going to be a part of injustice in general; equally, any special type of justice is going to be a part of justice in general.

Special injustice is going to concern honor, wealth, or safety and will aim at the pleasure that results from making a profit.  Injustice in general is going to concern that which makes one or keeps one from being an excellent person. 

So, what is the special type of justice?  When we were figuring out the general type, we decided that it involved being lawful/lawless and fair/unfair.  Special justice, however, involves one species that is: “… the distribution of honors or wealth or anything else that can be divided among members of a community who share in a political system …” (1130b30)—this clearly means that one person can have a share unequal to that of another’s.  Its second species: “… concerns rectification in transactions” (1131a), which then has two parts to it because some transactions are voluntary (e.g., buying, selling, lending, renting, etc.) and some are involuntary; the involuntary can be secret (e.g., theft, adultery, pimping, slavery, etc.) or involve force (imprisonment, murder, plunder, mutilation, slander, insult, etc.). 

A simplified chart, then:

Special Justice concerns:

1. (1)Distribution(aka Distributive Justice) 
   

2. (2)Rectification in Transactions  
   

       (A) Voluntary Rectification  

       (B) Involuntary Rectification

                    (1) Secret    

                    (2) Forced

Thus, Aristotle moves on to examine Special Justice in Distribution (ch.3) and Special Justice in Rectification (ch.4):

Ch 3) Justice in Distribution

Justice in Distribution is the first species of Justice.

Justice requires fairness (as we have established above).  So, “fair” is the mean in between two extremes of unfairness.  What is fair is what is equal.  Thus, justice (in distribution) requires equality—this equality relates to both people and things. 

However, equality is not absolute, for that would not be fair (we won’t pay Sally and John both $5 to be equal if Sally actually worked for it and John did not).  Thus, equality must be determined to be proportionate to worth in order for it to be fair.  To determine proportionate worth, there is the requirement that parties must be treated proportionately.

He then describes this spatially:

AEDCB

Where AD = DB and ED = DC

1) Offender = AD and Victim = DB,

2) Of. takes DC so…

3) Of. = AC and V. = CB, so…

4) AC > CB by ED+DC, so…

5) for restoration, take DC from Of., so Of. = AD, and

6) give DC to V., so V. = DB.

This is a precise sketch, where parties are absolutely equal.  To determine the restoration in a proportionate model, imagine three lines:

AEA’

BB’

DCFC’

Where CF = AE.

Following the above taking and restoring, we do not need to assume or determine the initial equality; thus, DC need not = CF and DC need not = AE (i.e., the Offender need not gain what the Victim loses).

Ch 4) Justice in Rectification

Justice in Rectification is the second species of Justice.

Justice in rectification differs from justice in distribution because it necessitates numerical equality.  In other words, it does not matter if the victimized party is a base person or good person; it (judged by law) only considers a certain, numerical equality.

Rectification necessitates a mean between gain (profit) and loss.  (Hence, the parties appeal to a judge, whom we may call an intermediate, because s/he will mediate the difference and award the intermediate to the victim, and thus restore justice.)

Rectification implies a fixing of inequity after the fact, thus Aristotle must delineate how this more precise, numerical equality is restored.  This is done by determining the numeric proportion between the larger and smaller lines, that is, two parties should have an equal amount, and if they do not, one determines how much the one with more has more than the one with less and divides the excess so that equality is restored.

 

Ch 5) Justice in Exchange

Simple Reciprocity is the idea of ‘an eye for an eye,’ and this is different from both distributive justice and rectificatory justice.  It is wrong for various possible reasons, but, in general, returning the same harm ignores the context ((1)a ruling official punishing a subordinate is not equal to a subordinate punishing a ruling official; the subordinate would need corrective treatment as well as a punishment for the harm and (2) if the harm was done voluntarily or involuntarily must be taken into account). 

However, in communities for exchange (i.e., economies), reciprocity is a way of being just: Exchange is a matter of reciprocity.  But, of course, this must be done proportionately, not simply.  (E.g., we exchange digging a ditch for food and drink; one party receiving a ditch is not identical to the other receiving food and drink).  Thus, this reciprocity in exchange that is done proportionately is secured through money.

Exchange came about due to need.  Money is the pledge of need.  It is a convention.  We make it meaningful or useless.  Without reciprocity, there could be no community.  Currency permits us to ensure a guarantee for a future exchange (e.g., a farmer may not need shoes from the cobbler when he gives him some corn (which prevents a straight barter of corn-shoes); so, the cobbler gives the farmer money so that when the farmer does need shoes, he can give that back to the cobbler and receive shoes): “Currency, then, by making things commensurate as a measure does, equalizes them; for there would be no community without exchange, no exchange without equality, no equality without commensuration.  And so, though things so different cannot become commensurate in reality, they can become commensurate enough in relation to our needs” (1133b17-20).  (Thus, while a doctor saving your life is given X amount, and that same X amount could buy a pair of earrings, we do not assume that saving life has the same absolute value in reality as jewelry, but they can become commensurate enough to make society function and needs met.)

Since Aristotle has just finished defining what is just and unjust, he says that the connection between justice and the doctrine of the mean has been established and is clear: doing justice is intermediate between doing injustice and suffering injustice.  This is because doing injustice results in having too much and suffering injustice results in having too little. 

Ch 6) Political Justice

As we have already determined through the first four books, actions are different than states.  Thus, unjust actions must be distinguished from unjust character. 

So what actions make one unjust?  Maybe it is not the type of actions done (one can steal and not be thief, sleep with another and not be adulterer), but with what intentions they are done?  …Oh, we have been through this before; but, that was about being just in general, now we are examining it in relation to political justice—and this, then, gives us our answer:

Political justice has two conditions: freedom and equality.

Justice belongs to those with law in their relations.  Law is an open possibility for all.  Violations make one unjust and we hold them in reproach for such.  Thus, Political Justice necessitates there being the rule of law.  This rule should be reason, not a person (e.g., even kings must obey law; king ≠ law; also, we should pay rulers in honor and privilege and they cannot take more than what the law gives them).  Thus, political justice necessitates there being the rule of law so as to prevent injustice being done by the rulers. 

Finally, while we can make an analogy between the state (rulers to citizens) and the family (head of household to its members), this is just analogous and the study of the rule of law and justice in the family are not the same.

Ch 7) Justice by Nature and by Law

Some believe that justice by law includes so much that this eliminates justice by nature as being something separate.  This is not the case, however.  There is a part of political justice that is natural and another part od political justice that is legal. 

Natural justice is equally valid everywhere for everyone; Legal justice is only valid when it has been established and under the conditions of its establishment (and can also be known as the specific rulings of specific cases). 

But, just because Natural justice is valid universally, this does not mean that it never ever changes—everything is changeable; this does not destroy its definition or reject its existence; natural justice perfectly legitimately permits some variation in accordance with different circumstances.

Why?  Because just action can be thought of as composed of two aspects: Universals and Particulars.  Just as helping a little old lady cross a street is a good act, and not the definition of being good in general, there is a difference in universals and particulars in regards to natural and legal justice. 

Ch 8) Justice, Injustice, and the Voluntary

This chapter is a reconsideration of the discussion of Voluntary, Involuntary, and Mixed actions conducted at the start of Book III put into a juridical context.  Unjust acts must be done voluntarily for them to be considered unjust acts.  Voluntary action necessitates the power of the agent to act upon choice based upon appropriate knowledge. 

These are distinguished from just and unjust actions that happen by chance or coincidence. 

He then explores voluntary action versus action based upon decision. 

Some voluntary actions act upon previous decision; some do not.  Since decision involves deliberation, some actions then act upon previous deliberation and some do not. 

Then the question moves to delineating different ways of violating justice:

Errors result in involuntary actions.  “If, then, the infliction of harm violates reasonable expectation, the action is a misfortune.  If it does not violate reasonable expectation, but is done without vice, it is an error.  For someone is in error if the principle of the cause is in him, and unfortunate when it is outside” (1135b17-20).

If s/he acts with knowledge, but without previous deliberation, it is an act of injustice.  But, remember, an act is different than a state.  So, the wrong decision (and only such) makes the agent unjust (note: this is just decision, not deliberation because deliberation is on ends...which means one would have knowledge of the end (the greatest good of happiness) and injustice cannot get us this happiness, thus, we do not deliberate and then do wrong, we only have knowledge and make a decision, skipping the deliberation).  This accounts for how we legitimately pardon some actions that are unjust and do not pardon others.

Ch 9) Puzzles about Justice and Injustice

The first question asked is: whether someone can suffer injustice voluntarily?  (§§1-8)

It seems as if the incontinent person does suffer injustice voluntarily, but this is not really the case.

The second question asked is: can someone do injustice to oneself?  (§§9-13)

As he has already established, being just is different than doing just actions—it requires more.

The scope of justice explains some of the difficulties and disputes (§§14-17).

Justice is tough.  It may seem easy to do good, but so many factors play a role in how we feel when we need to do things.  It equally may seem easy to know lots of things, but to know how these many things relate to justice is tough. 

Ch 10) Decency

Now the puzzles concern decency and justice.  At first thought, what is decent seems the same as what is good/just.  But… then we think about it and it seems that they can conflict with one another. 

Hence… The puzzle is that decency seems to conflict with justice. 

But, it does not really conflict with justice when we correctly understand what is justice. 

Specifically, “The puzzle arises because the decent is just, but is not the legally just, but a rectification of it” (1137b13)—that is, law is universal, but no universal can be correct in every single particular. 

The decent is just (although not all that is just is decent).  The decent is better than a certain way of being just, but not better than the unqualifiedly just.  For example, the just itself is best in its universal way; but, when considering particulars, sometimes a decent act is better than a just act.  “This is also the reason why not everything is guided by law” (1137b28-29).

Ch 11) Injustice to Oneself

The final set of puzzles concern injustice to oneself.  He begins with the distinction of Injustice in General and Special Injustice. 

Can one do injustice to oneself?  (§§1-6)

In one sense, yes; in another sense, no.  In terms of Injustice in General, yes, one can do injustice to oneself—e.g., legally forbidden to murder ourselves, so, if we murder ourselves, we have done something unjust.  But, we have to ask to whom is the injustice done?  It is done to the city that has made the law that forbids one murdering oneself.  In another sense, if we think of justice as one of the virtues, instead of obedience to all the virtues, then one can violate one virtue and cannot be doing an injustice to one’s self in the special sense.  In this case, one has not / cannot do injustice to oneself because the person who loses, for example, their life, does not then gain more, making something unjust, that is, they do not then gain another/more of their life (this is not sensible). 

He then asks whether it is worse to do injustice or to suffer injustice? (§§7-8)

Doing injustice is worse than to suffer injustice.  Why?  Because doing injustice is blameworthy because it involves vice.  We do not say in all cases that one who suffers injustice is to be blamed for such suffering (because it does not involve vice).  Suffering injustice may be horrible, but not as bad as doing it. 

And ends (§9) with a question as to whether there can be both justice and injustice within a single individual?

Not every type of justice, but a certain type (having to do with masters or households), may result in a person who is partly just and partly unjust because different parts of the soul control different virtues.  Thus, one may rule justly over others, yet suffer a certain injustice to oneself.

Book VI:  Intellectual Virtues   {Virtues of Thought}

The virtues of intellect/thought concern the ability and disposition to choose the mean between extremes and include Prudence/Practical Wisdom (Phronesis), Understanding/Mind (Nous), Scientific Knowledge (Epistêmê), Craft Knowledge (Techne), and Wisdom (Sofia).  Of these, Prudence/Practical Wisdom (Phronesis) is essential; it is the knowledge of how to secure the ends of life, the virtue that gets one happiness, and is perfection of the activity of discerning the good. 

Chapter Three lists five states in which the soul grasps the truth: Craft Knowledge, Scientific Knowledge, Prudence, Wisdom, and Understanding. 

Chapter Six lists four states, the Intellectual Virtues, as: Scientific Knowledge, Prudence, Wisdom, and Understanding. 

As Aristotle says in chapter 11: “It is reasonable that all these states tend in the same direction.  For we ascribe consideration, comprehension, prudence, and understanding to the same people, and say that these have consideration, and thereby understanding, and that they are prudent and comprehending” (1143a25-6).  While this list does not entirely or just address the Intellectual Virtues per se, we see a little bit here just how blurry the lines are between the different ones and how they all work together.  Given this disparity of lists and the ambiguity of this in theory and translation, let us first specify and attempt to define in a more rigid manner the Intellectual Virtues:

Understanding: (Nous)  Sound intuition; the state encompassing rational thought and understanding of first principles.

This is the state encompassing rational thought and understanding of first principles (the truths that serve as ultimate explanations behind other correct answers).  In essence, this is sound intuition.  There must be a separate Intellectual Virtue that grasps principles, truths in themselves because the other Intellectual Virtues are engaged with particulars to varying degrees (e.g., Prudence (Phronesis) with the application of Character Virtues to situations, Wisdom (Sophia) concerning the best kind of knowledge, and Scientific Knowledge (Episteme) that necessitates its demonstration (1141a4-7)—BUT, of course this is a little blurry because chapter 11, §2 lists Understanding as a capacity “… about the last things, i.e., particulars” (1143a27)… so, we try to understand Understanding as only concerned with first principles, the universals, but it must also have some connections to particulars because all the Intellectual Virtues need to help us choose the mean, which occurs in relation to particulars—explained in ch.11 §4: in demonstrations, understanding is about the first principles (the unchanging terms); in premises about actions, understanding is about the last term (the changing particulars)).  Nous’ first principles are truths that cannot have a further account given of them precisely because they are the principles of that which we have understanding. 

Scientific Knowledge: (Knowledge; Epistêmê)  Knowledge of action; The state wherein one correctly grasps (and can demonstrate) the truth of a science (its first principles).

The state wherein one correctly grasps the truth of a science.  This is a demonstrative state wherein one has the appropriate confidence and knows the principles (1139b33-35).  Knowledge concerns truths as first principles; these are what do not admit of being otherwise (1139b20), thus, they are know by necessity, they are everlasting, ingenerable, and indestructible (thus, simply put, scientific knowledge it is distinct from opinion or belief (doxa)).  The different sciences have their own bodies of knowledge, thus each has its own set of first principles; the correct grasp of any science’s first principles is the Intellectual Virtue of Episteme.  It seems that Episteme is a more specific type of Nous, which also concerns the understanding of first principles, just not those tied to a specific science, but to thought in itself. 

Craft Knowledge: (Technē)  Knowledge of production; A state involving true reason concerned with production (how changeable things come to be) wherein the principle is in the producer (not product). 

A state involving true reason concerned with production.  Any craft is concerned with something coming to be; craft knowledge, then, is the study of how something that admits of being and not being comes to be, something whose principle is in the producer, and not the product.  Thus, production is different than action, which can have its principles outside of it.  This type of knowledge, then, is distinct from Scientific Knowledge.  It is unclear the degree to which this stands alone, however, as its own virtue; it may be subsumed under Scientific Knowledge as Episteme, thus, being just a type of Knowledge (however chapter four clearly separates them so that Knowledge only includes that of laws, necessary, invariable truths).

Prudence: (Practical Wisdom; Phronēsis)  Good deliberation; the state wherein one has good deliberation about what contributes to one’s happiness in general (the actions about things that are good or bad for a human being), resulting in a correct supposition about the end, which, in turn, is the principle for further correct deliberation. 

The state wherein one has good deliberation (grasping the truth, involving reason) about what contributes to one’s happiness in general (the actions about things that are good or bad for a human being), resulting in a correct supposition about the end, which, in turn, is the principle for further correct deliberation (1140b5-7 and 1140b20-1).  Thus, Prudence is good deliberation (which is deliberation about the end) and correct supposition of this end (necessitated for the deliberation)—hence his comment that prudence preserves the right sort of supposition (1140b) and that Prudence is about human concerns (1141b10; i.e., not just about universals (1141b15), but particulars and universals (1141b22-4), and this is why it is opposite to Understanding, which only deals with universals (1142a26)).  While all Intellectual Virtues concern the ability and disposition to choose the mean, prudence is most specifically concerning the correct application of Character Virtues to particular circumstances.  (Thus, the prudent one cannot be incontinent (intemperate, akolasia, akrasia); although prudence is difficult because one can be in an error in deliberation about either the universal or the particular (1142a22-4)).  (While this is essential to complete virtue, the translation of this is difficult; “Prudence” is helpful in that it suggests a concern for one’s welfare, but do not interpret it narrowly as a selfish caution—as he says, there are different types that we all call Prudence, e.g., prudence of household science, legislative, political, deliberative, and juridical prudences (1141b30-35); “Practical Wisdom” is a better translation because it concerns intelligent awareness in general, but do not confuse this with the other Intellectual Virtue of Wisdom (Sophia)). 

Good Deliberation: a type of inquiry (good deliberator inquires); it is not scientific knowledge (because we don’t deliberate about what we already know); not good guessing (b/c deliberation involves reason and takes time, which guessing does not); not quick thinking (b/c quick thinking is just good guessing, and deliberation is not guessing); not just belief (good deliberation is correct, belief need not be); not just correct scientific knowledge or correct belief (b/c scientific knowledge is correct, so we do not specify it as correct or incorrect, if it is S.K., then it is already, necessarily correct; and b/c belief is already determined); it requires reason, thus, it belongs to thought (thought is not yet assertion, which would be belief); “… in deliberating, … we inquire for something and rationally calculate about it” (1142b12-14); good deliberating is a certain sort of correctness in deliberation; its correctness is the sort that reaches a good (hence, incontinent is not good deliberation) in the right way (cannot just accidently hit the good), about the right thing, and at the right time, to the highest good (can be unqualified and promote the highest good, or limited, and promote just a limited good; so good deliberation must aim at the best good (1142b30-5).

Comprehension: Has the same subject matter as Prudence (Phronesis), but is not prescriptive.  Good comprehension is not scientific knowledge, not belief, not any specific knowledge of a science, not about eternal universals, it IS about what we may puzzle about and might deliberate about; it judges (whereas Prudence is prescriptive, it tells us what action we must or must not do; instead, good comprehension is like learning as a comprehension in the application of a scientific knowledge or the application of a belief in order to judge someone else’s remarks on a question of Prudence; it is a learning as a grasping). 

“Considerateness is the correct consideration that judges what is decent; and correct consideration judges what is true” (1143a22-24).

Wisdom: (Sophia, Sofia)  Insight; Understanding + Scientific Knowledge = Wisdom; the state of wisdom, which is confined to the best kind of knowledge. 

The state of wisdom, which is confined to the best kind of knowledge.  It excludes craft knowledge and Prudence (Phronesis) because they cannot have exactness; only Scientific Knowledge constitutes Wisdom, thus, Wisdom is the most exact form of scientific knowledge (1141a16).  It is concerned purely with study, not with action.  The Wise person must know what is derived from the principles of a science and grasp the truth about the principles (thus, understanding (of the best things) + scientific knowledge (of the best things) = Wisdom (1141a17-20 and 1141b2-5)).

Textual Analysis (chapters 1-13):

Ch. 1) Mean and Virtues of Thought

Since Virtue is composed of Character and Intellectual Virtue, we now need to explore Intellectual Virtue.

As with all of the Character Virtues, we sought the mean—having the virtue was having the mean.  We determined this mean through habituation, but also with appeal to our faculty of reason (recall that voluntary action required choice, deliberation, and then acting from a firm stance).  So, since having the mean involved correct reason, this necessitates that we explain correct reason …

This requires an account of the rational part of the soul (yes, his conception of the soul has three parts, but two (the nutritive/vegetative and the sensitive) are nonrational, where as the third part is the rational).  He proposes that we divide the rational part of the soul into: 1) studies beings whose principles that do not admit being otherwise than what they are (i.e. the scientific part) and 2) studies beings whose principles that do admit being otherwise than what they are (i.e. the rationally calculating part, which is the same as deliberating). 

So… we need to find the best state for each part of the rational part of the soul—this state will be that part’s virtue.  Since a thing’s virtue is relative to its proper function, we must determine the function of each part.

Ch. 2) Thought, Desire, Deliberation

There are three capacities of the soul that control action and truth: sense perception, understanding (including thought and reason), and desire.  But, he qualifies this, sense perception is not the principle of any action (since animals have perception, but do not participate in action (action, here, meaning specifically rational action based upon decision, because obviously animals have action in the sense of locomotion, etc.).  So, we have left understanding (which involves assertion and denial) and desire (which involves pursuit and avoidance). 

As we learned, Character Virtue requires decision.  So, now, we see that decision is not just a matter of thought, but also of desire—decision is a deliberative desire.  Since what thought asserts, desire pursues, we need correct decision, thus we need correct thought to direct correct desire. 

Practical thought must be concerned with truth.

What is the role of thought in action?

What is the relation of thought and desire in a correct decision?

Virtues of Thought are relevant to correct decision.

Ch. 3) Scientific Knowledge

The virtues of thought: craft knowledge, scientific knowledge, prudence, wisdom, and understanding.  –note—these are described as “… the five states in which the soul grasps the truth in its affirmations and denials” (1139b16-7.)

See above for detail…

Scientific knowledge: about necessary facts, principles cannot be scientifically known, requires demonstration from indemonstrable principles.

Ch. 4) Craft Knowledge

Differentiate production and action. 

Craft is part of production

See above for detail…

Ch. 5) Prudence

Requires deliberation about living well.

Neither scientific thought nor craft knowledge.

Concerned with action, not production.

Defense of account of prudence: fits character of people that are prudent; fits relation between prudence and temperance; fits that prudence cannot be misused or forgotten.

See above for detail…

Ch. 6) Understanding

There must be a virtue of thought concerned with principles: this is understanding.

See above for detail…

Ch. 7) Wisdom versus Prudence

Wisdom: embraces scientific knowledge and understanding; concerned with highest principles (in contrast to prudence).

Wisdom’s contrast to Prudence: prudence is concerned with action, it must consider particulars.

See above for detail…

Ch. 8) Types of Prudence

Range of Prudence: universals and particulars.

Applications of prudence to individual and community; prudence must consider the individual’s good with reference to a community; thus, it is difficult to acquire and depends upon experience.

Prudence is different from scientific knowledge and understanding because it must consider particulars.

See above for detail…

Ch. 9) Good Deliberation

Involves inquiry; thus, it must be distinguished from intellectual states resultant from completed inquiry.

Correctness in deliberation requires correct conclusion, correct process, and aim at the correct end.

Good Deliberation: a type of inquiry (good deliberator inquires); it is not scientific knowledge (because we don’t deliberate about what we already know); not good guessing (b/c deliberation involves reason and takes time, which guessing does not); not quick thinking (b/c quick thinking is just good guessing, and deliberation is not guessing); not just belief (good deliberation is correct, belief need not be); not just correct scientific knowledge or correct belief (b/c scientific knowledge is correct, so we do not specify it as correct or incorrect, if it is S.K., then it is already, necessarily correct; and b/c belief is already determined); it requires reason, thus, it belongs to thought (thought is not yet assertion, which would be belief); “… in deliberating, … we inquire for something and rationally calculate about it” (1142b12-14); good deliberating is a certain sort of correctness in deliberation; its correctness is the sort that reaches a good (hence, incontinent is not good deliberation) in the right way (cannot just accidently hit the good), about the right thing, and at the right time, to the highest good (can be unqualified and promote the highest good, or limited, and promote just a limited good; so good deliberation must aim at the best good (1142b30-5).

Ch. 10) Comprehension

Same subject matter as Prudence; unlike prudence, it is not prescriptive.

Comprehension: Has the same subject matter as Prudence (Phronesis), but is not prescriptive.  Good comprehension is not scientific knowledge, not belief, not any specific knowledge of a science, not about eternal universals, it IS about what we may puzzle about and might deliberate about; it judges (whereas Prudence is prescriptive, it tells us what action we must or must not do; instead, good comprehension is like learning as a comprehension in the application of a scientific knowledge or the application of a belief in order to judge someone else’s remarks on a question of Prudence; it is a learning as a grasping). 

Ch. 11) Practical Thought and Particulars

§1: Consideration and Considerateness—this may read better as the ending thought to chapter 10.

§§2-7: Application of practical thought to particulars: Different virtues are needed to grasp particulars; special role of understanding in grasping particulars; virtues of thought that grasp particulars develop through experience.

In discussing the application of practical thought to particulars, chapter 11, §2, there is a blurriness that arises because Aristotle lists (amongst consideration, comprehension, prudence) Understanding as a capacity “… about the last things, i.e., particulars” (1143a27)… so, we try to understand Understanding as a state only concerned with first principles, the universals, but it must also have some connections to particulars because all the Intellectual Virtues need to help us choose the mean, which occurs in relation to particulars.  He explains how this works in §4: in demonstrations, understanding is about the first principles (the unchanging terms); in premises about actions, understanding is about the last term (the changing particulars).

The important part is that different virtues are needed to grasp particulars (because all things achievable in action are particular and last things); these Intellectual Virtues must work together in varying ways. 

Ch. 12) Puzzles about Prudence and Wisdom

How do they contribute to being virtuous?

How does Prudence help us to become virtuous?

Does Prudence control wisdom?

The puzzle is set up because it seems that Wisdom does not study a source of human happiness (because wisdom is concerned with study, not action) and it seems that Prudence studies happiness, but it does not help to make someone good if s/he is already good (and doesn’t help become good really because the good already are and the not-good can do good by sheer mimicry and obedience to laws, not deliberating on goodness and if it were merely for becoming good, then Prudence would control Wisdom, which would be “absurd” because it would be a lesser controlling a greater).

Aristotle’s Response:

1) Both Prudence and Wisdom must be choice-worthy in themselves—even if neither produces anything (because each is a virtue of the two rational parts of the soul (those where principles change; those where principles don’t change)). 

2) And… they do produce something… Wisdom produces happiness (like how health produces health, as opposed to how medicine produces health).  Prudence helps to produce the excellent fulfilling of our function (fulfillment of function (having reason) excellent when in accord with Virtue, which means doing/being Character Virtues plus having Prudence to know how these means apply to situations).  (He adds here that the Nutritive Part of the Soul has no virtue of its own because nothing is up to it to do or not do… that is fine, but he calls it the fourth part of the soul—do not let this confuse: there are commonly only three parts of the soul, the Rational, the Sensitive, and the Nutritive, but, here, re: chapter one, he has divided the Rational part of the soul into two, one that deals with the changeable things and one that deals with the unchangeable things.)

So… how do we address the puzzles? 

1) We must remember that accidently doing good actions does not mean that our state of being is good, because state requires the decision and deliberation about the knowledge so as to choose the mean. 

2) Virtue makes the decision correct.  But actions done to fulfill correct decision are not the concern of the virtue, but another capacity.  This capacity is Cleverness—the ability to do the actions that fulfill the decision; cleverness can promote virtue or vice dependent on its goal being praiseworthy or base.  Prudence is not cleverness, but requires cleverness and virtue—the best good is capable/apparent for only the good person; cannot be Prudent without being good.

 

Ch. 13) Prudence and Virtue of Character

Connection between virtue of character and prudence.

Full virtue (versus natural virtue) requires prudence.

Character virtue and prudence require one another.

Relation of prudence to wisdom.

Virtue is similar to Prudence in analogy to how Prudence is similar to Cleverness and in this way, the analogy extends to how Natural Virtue is similar to Full Virtue. 

By nature, we all tend to having varying degrees of character (of virtue); “But if someone acquires Understanding, he improves in his actins; and the state he now has, though still similar [to the natural one], will be fully virtue” (1144b12-3).  In the way that there is Prudence and Cleverness, there is also Natural Virtue and Full Virtue.  Full virtue cannot be acquired without Prudence.

This is why some say that all virtues are Prudence (as did Socrates, according to Aristotle), and we respond that they are partially correct and partially wrong—the correctness is because all virtues require Prudence, the incorrectness is because they are not all the same as Prudence. 

Restate current conclusion: “… we cannot be fully good without prudence, or prudent without the virtue of character” (1144b31). 

Book VII:  “Incontinence” or “Unrestraint” (Akrasia) Chapters 1-10; “Pleasure,” Chapters 11-14

Akrasia: incontinence, lack of Self Restraint, not in command, lack of control, weakness, moral weakness, weakness in will… its opposite is enkrateia, being in command, continence, self-control, strength of character, moral strength, strength of will.

The difficulty is in differentiating these contraries firmly from vice and virtue.  Like virtue and vice, they are persistent states of the soul, in that it refers to the condition of one’s soul, not just an event of a grasp or lack of control.  While not virtue or vice, they fall somewhere between them when we consider character.  This suggests continence and incontinence to be very common.  This is very troubling because what do we do with the many who may frequently fall under these terms?  It is clear when one is virtuous, they should be commended and when one is vice-ridden, one should be reproached; but what about the continent and incontinent?  When one is virtuous, one’s non-rational impulses are harmonized with what the rational part of the soul requires; the virtuous has properly habituated the virtues, so that s/he does not desire to do wrong.  Thus, doing good brings pleasure and doing wrong brings discomfort.  The incontinent person, however, can have the virtuous thought, and yet persistently desires to do otherwise and cannot control these desires; the continent person has virtuous thoughts, persistently desires to do otherwise, but can control these desires.  The difference is that their character is not habituated in such a way so that they do not desire wrongs, but only what is good. 

Thus:      VirtueContinentIncontinentVice

What s/he thinks s/he should do:Y  Y          Y          N

What s/he has impulses to do:Y  N          N          N

What s/he actually does:         Y  Y          N          N

The degree of how common and how close these are to virtue and vice explains Aristotle’s exhaustive treatment—he delineates at least fourteen commonly held opinions as to what these are and have as attributes, for example, continence is good, abides by reason, uses reason to not act on bad desire, is tough, self-mastery, not self-indulgent, has practical wisdom, and incontinence is bad, does not abide by reason, acts on bad desires because of emotion, is soft (effeminate), lack of self-mastery, self-indulgent, w/o practical wisdom, and both concern controlling or not one’s temper, seeking honor, and seeking profit.

He also sets his argument against Socrates, who rejected akrasia because he believed that (a) virtue is knowledge, (b) all desire the good / no one desires evil, (c) no one deliberately does evil, (c) if it turns out to be evil, it is simply because we were ignorant about what the good was truly.  Aristotle rejects this plea to ignorance—he believed that there is a form of ignorance at play which is caused by disordered nonrational desires, but we do not have complete ignorance of general principles (e.g., we know we should not steal, but we do not know how to apply this principle to some particular cases, like money found on the street).  Thus, he stresses the role of knowledge at work in Akrasia (using both doxa, opinion or belief, and epiteme, knowledge and the role logos, reason plays therein).  We do have knowledge and make the right choice based upon that knowledge, but then our desire for pleasure somehow overcomes our reasoning about the right choice—we indulge evil even when we know it is not good.  Hoe does an emotion/appetite overcome themore superior faculty of reason?  Perhaps the emotion/appetite is so, so powerful it overwhelms it or, perhaps our reasoning gives way to emotion/appetite?  But, the first violates the power of perfect reason and the latter makes a terribly blurry distinction from the vice ridden person who deliberately sets out to indulge his/her appetites.  Thus, it is not entirely correct to say reason is overpowered or that it gives way to emotion; instead, it is a passive-overpowerment—the emotion is pathos.  Incontinence is weakness of will wherein one rather collapses in one’s restraint: I may know X is better than Y, yet I choose Y anyway.  One knows that one ought not overindulge one’s appetites; to eat fifteen cupcakes is overindulgence; one makes the correct decision not to eat them; then, eats them anyway.  Or, Augustine’s famous remark, God grant me chastity and continence, but not just yet” (Confessions 8.7.17).  Thus, the intemperate person (vice) is “deliberately led about [by his desires], accepting that ‘I should always pursue the pleasure that’s before me’; an akratic person in contrast does not accept this, yet he pursues it anyway” (1146b23-4).

The process by which one lapses into an event of akrasia is progressive—its onset, course, and dissipation are comparable to an illness (1150b29-36) (and one can be predisposed more or less than others to it, as one can be to illness).

The long discussion of Akrasia, however, should not push us to think that pleasures are terrible.  Remember that the temperate person enjoys the right things n the right way at the right time.  Thus, he concludes Book VII with another discussion of pleasure.  His main point here is to argue that happiness, in addition to being the greatest good, is also the most pleasant. 

Many live the life that seeks pleasure… but, maybe we all ought to—just, for “good” pleasure.  “Pleasure,” however, is a nebulous idea—is it a state, feeling, a source for feelings, a preference, etc.?  Aristotle gives us two definitions of pleasure, the first in our reading (the second in Book X, chs. 1-5):

Pleasure is the unimpeded activity of a living thing in its natural condition (1153a12-5).

Pleasure is an end which supervenes upon and completes an activity (1174b31-33).

Take the first: “Pleasure is the unimpeded activity of a living thing in its natural condition” (1153a12-5)—pleasure, then, is an activity one can do freely, an unhindered activity (one’s natural condition is like a healthy, good, active condition, as opposed to when one needs to revive or restore oneself).  Activities, then, are pleasure, e.g., the pleasure of seeing a beautiful sunrise or painting is that activity of seeing—pleasure and activity are linked.  The second separates activity and pleasure, putting pleasure as an end following consequent from activity.

Importantly, he establishes that goodness, pleasure, and attractiveness are coincident.  Also, that pleasure ties closely to motivation.  Thus, pleasure is good and the greatest good is pleasant. 

He establishes these points by explicating all the arguments for pleasure as not being good and that the greatest good cannot be pleasure, then argues against these, then establishes that pleasure is good and that the greatest good is pleasurable and why people have come to think the opposite.

Why people have come to think the opposite is for numerous reasons, non-exhaustively including:

(a) pleasure and good are taken to be distinct, if they are distinct, then pleasure is not-good, thus pleasure is not good in that it is bad (1152b8).

(b) most pleasures are bad (1152b10)

(c) greatest good must be truly (wholly, in every aspect) good (1096b10-14)

(d) pleasure is seen as a process; processes have ends, ends are not good, thus pleasure is not good (1152b12-15)

But…

Pleasure is good & the greatest good is pleasant (1152b25-6).  Pain is bad; pleasure is its opposite; thus, pleasure is some type of good (1153b4).  Pleasure is free activity of things in good condition; actions in accord with virtue are activities of a human in good condition; if unimpeded, then these actions are pleasurable; happiness is either all or some of these together; thus, happiness is a particular pleasure (1153b9-14).