Introduction to Philosophy Pages
![Contents:
I) A Brief History
II) A Reflection on Method
III) The Theory of Forms
IV) Textual Analysis of the Dialogue
I) A Brief History
Socrates (ca. 470-399 b.c.e.)
Plato (ca. 428-348 b.c.e.)
Socrates wrote nothing down himself, thus all that we know of him comes from the dialogues transcribed by his student, Plato (who, himself, started The Academy, the first multi-subject educational institution in 387 b.c.e., which lasted nine centuries), other philosophical record, and ancient histories and comedies (notably Aristophanes’) that make reference to him or use him as a central character for parody.
In the dialogues collected in The Trial and Death of Socrates (a later editing, not originally written together as a single volume), we learn about the before, during, and after of Socrates’ trial by Meletus (also Lycon and Anytus) for corrupting the youth by his impiety (in Apology, we learn the charges to be more complex, corrupting the youth and impiety, either as atheism or as invention of new gods, alongside implicit charges of making the weaker argument the stronger, i.e., studying things in the sky and beneath the ground, teaching these things to others, and accepting a fee for teaching). He is found guilty by the jury and sentenced to death.
But, why was Socrates on trial? On the one hand, from reading the dialogues we get a clear picture of how Socrates is truly the “gadfly,” a complete pest who cuts through egocentric hubris and intellectually puts people in their place; but, being a sometimes obnoxious old man is not really reason for a death sentence. So, on the other hand, another way to understand his trial is to understand the historical background of Socrates’ Athens. In brief:
Building the Empire: After 500 b.c.e., after Tyrant rule, various battles against the Persians led to the development of the Greek empire and Athens’ Golden Age. More specifically, Greek colonies near Turkey came under threat from Persia, the Athenians offered support to the colonies, thus unleashing a Persian invasion of the Greek mainland. In 490 b.c.e., the Athenians won a great land battle at Marathon, 26 miles from Athens, rejecting the Persian assault. This battle initiated the Greek’s building of a navy, which was soon to become their central power, defeating the Persians for a second time in 479 b.c.e.. After the second Persian assault, Athens formed a defense league that eventually became its empire. Athens had popular government at home, but ruled over those overseas, thus, from this empire it became rich, instigating massive development, architectural wonders like the Acropolis, and began to attract many intellectuals.
Peloponnesian War: 431 b.c.e., between Sparta and Athens; the Spartans were powerful on land and the Athenians, with their large Navy, by sea, thus creating a long war where both sides were worn, but no major advances or victories happened by either side. After about ten years of fighting, a 50 year peace accord was signed, the Peace of Nicias (named after the Athenian general). Nicias, however, had fierce rivalry in the Assembly, notably by Socrates’ student, Alcibiades. Alcibiades, against Nicias, convinced the people to attack the island of Sicily in 415 b.c.e.. This attack was a disaster, leaving Athens weak, which was the opportunity that the Spartans had been waiting for; they attacked with the aid of the Persians (out of resentment for an attack by Athens in the early 5th c. b.c.e.). In 404 b.c.e., almost thirty years after the war began, Athens saw its defeat by Sparta.
Spartan Control: The Spartan’s now had unlimited yet indirect control over the Greek city-states; instead of ruling directly by implanting their own appointee, the Spartan’s pressured the Athenian Assembly to vote to choose thirty men as a Spartan-loyal oligarchic government, thus known as “the Thirty.” The Thirty effectively eliminated all political opposition with the support of the Spartan troops bringing on a fierce reign of terror. Their reign caused many Athenians to flee Athens as exiles, including the former generals of the prior democracy, notably including Anytus (one who indicted Socrates) and Thrasbulus.
In 403 the exiled democratic Athenians led an offensive on Athens, eventually defeating the Thirty. Democracy was restored and an amnesty was decreed asking for the exile of those friendly to the Thirty and disallowing any criminal cases concerning matters before the restoration of the democracy.
Socrates had remained in Athens during the Thirty’s rule, yet did not become involved with their crimes (although 5,000 Athenians had fled, and 1,500 of those who stayed were killed). In fact, he invited his own downfall by refusing to carry out a mission he had been given by the Thirty to arrest a man; had the Thirty not fallen soon after his refusal, he would likely have been killed. Nonetheless, there was a lot of hostility towards him; previously he had been seen as a bit of an eccentric, but not harmful nor dangerous. With the restoration of democracy, however, a great deal of blame, suspicion, and anger was directed at him; notably, he was seen as somehow responsible for his students’ (Alcibiades, Critias, Charmides, etc.) behavior in weakening Athens, supporting the Thirty, etc. Also, there were prolific writers (notably the politically conservative comedic writer Aristophanes), who were writing hyperbolic or spoof accounts of the dangers of Socrates.
II) A Reflection on Method
As with most of the philosophers that we will read this semester, that is to say, most philosophers in general, there is a symbiosis between their form and content: the way in which they work out their ideas is as important as what it is that they say. Plato is an excellent example of this.
In addition to his fame (perhaps infamy) for his relation of Socratic Irony, most memorable cuts and barbs (he relates various interlocutors calling Socrates all sorts of odd names, mostly playful putdowns), and the relation of interesting myth and anecdotes, his form of argumentation itself is most impressive. We call this form:
Elenchos: this is a back-and-forth-and-progressive form of argumentation wherein a line of reasoning moves forward by countering or refuting a proposed claim by validating its conclusion’s opposites.
For example, here is a premise: Justice is the will of the strong. This premise logically necessitates the truth of the claim: thus, there is no justice for the weak. Elenchos would then counter this original premise by validating its consequent claim’s opposite: but there are cases of the weak receiving justice and laws are designed to be blind, thus justice is not the will of the strong.
Almost all of Socrates’ works (as transcribed and/or crafted by Plato) are in the form of dialogues that utilize this method of elenchos. They begin with an interlocutor proclaiming knowledge and Socrates’ proclaiming ignorance, Socrates seeks the wisdom of the other, but then demonstrates the other to not actually know that which he proclaimed to know.
The underlying form of Socrates’ argument is this:
(1) If you, interlocutor, know what X is, then you ought to be able to give an account of it or say what it is.
(2) The knowing interlocutor cannot give a proper account of X:
--The interlocutor’s first thesis typically mis-defines the matter of investigation by declaring a faulty universal that appears as a self-interested instance (i.e. the thief would say: human nature proves we are naturally greedy).
--Socrates must then clarify the question (no… I mean, what is human nature?).
--The interlocutor’s second thesis is a general definition that Socrates explicitly or implicitly refutes by exposing its internal inconsistencies.
--This interplay happens at least twice with each definition being a slight improvement over the former.
(3) Socrates concludes that the interlocutor does not know X, thus justifying the investigation into its nature or existence, no mater how mundane.
The actual transformation from presumed knowledge to revealed ignorance is never a short and easy path, and is what makes for the substance of the dialogues.
Instead of a dramatic ascent to the true answer, the dialogue reaches aporia, a state of perplexity, which the interlocutor welcomes or resists leading Socrates to either lead the conversation toward a new account that fails through the interlocutor’s misunderstanding or lament his interlocutor’s abrupt exit.
III) The Theory of Forms
What we encounter in the world through sensory experience is not the truly real, but re-presentations of what is truly real: the eternal and unchanging Forms (eidos, ideas), which can only be grasped intellectually.
An example: Circles: Imagine the perfect circle. This circle does not exist in the natural world; instead there are only round things, imperfect circles. The perfect circle is the Form “Circle;” it is by that idea of perfection that we can then compare the circles we encounter in the world so as to know them as circles or not.
When we measure this or that round thing, we compare its roundness to the perfect one, the Form. Things “participate” in the Forms, so this circle participates in the Idea of Circularity.
{Also, consider the idea of a ruler—a literal one concerning measurement, such as a yardstick—somewhere behind glass in a museum there may be the ultimate, first, perfect ruler... yet every school child may have a ruler in her bag and every contractor may be able to ‘eyeball’ a perfect twelve inches. How do all these different people have rulers, are able to rule/measure something? Each incarnation of another ruler or activity of measuring something are re-presentations of the ideal, originary ruler—that one to which we only have intellectual access.}
Some of Plato’s dialogues suggest that there is a clear hierarchy of the Forms (e.g., Symposium, Phaedrus, etc.; the medieval adoption of this idea clearly posited a hierarchy therein, so that Good was the pinnacle of Forms); for example, circularity participates in the Form Beauty although Beauty does not participate in the Form circularity. The seemingly most important Forms for Socrates include: Good, Truth, Justice, and Beauty.
The hierarchy of the forms permits a cosmological account of how people differ from one another by nature (cf., Symposium, Phaedrus, etc.). The Forms permit us to know the truth; everyone is capable of a degree of the truth because the Forms rest innate in our souls and only need to be remembered by reflection and education (thus, his dialogue Meno argues that education is a matter of the recollection of truth). But, some people will be tyrants and some will be wise men or women; this is partially determined by the degree to which they reflect upon the good life in their lives, but also because of the degree to which their souls were able to access the Forms before being re-embodied in new forms of life. This cosmological plus pedagogic accounts also render an ethical dictum: To strive to remember the Forms is to come to know the absolute truth and to become just and wise.
But, the idea of an ideal and its re-presentations aid us in many areas of thought, much like a distinction between genus and species. (For example, there is the genus “tree,” to which there are oak, elm, ash, and willow species; the Form would be like the genus, while its re-presentations here in reality around us would be its species.) Critiquing Euthyphro’s first definition of piety, Socrates complains, “… I did not bid you tell me one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious …” (6d). That is, to name the Form “circularity,” do not point to a full moon, an orange, a wheel, and a baseball, but name that which all of these things share in common: the nature of circularity itself.
IV) Textual Analysis of the Dialogue
Socrates’ method of elenchos, seeking the proper definition of X, is seeking the Form, the thing-in-itself. We see this excellently in the Euthyphro where the X or unknown is “piety.”
For the Greeks: piety tends to mean outward observances to gods, country, and parents. It means acting in expected ways and has little to do with beliefs.
The Characters:
Euthyphro: we know about Euthyphro only what we learn in this dialogue; he is an acquaintance of Socrates’; he is the accuser of his father; a classic seer, someone claiming to foretell the future but therefore always open to charge of charlatanism
Socrates: he does not often go to the king-archon’s court (one of the nine Athenian magistrates who dealt with religious ritual and oversaw cases of alleged offenses to the gods); Euthyphro likens him to himself, a seer, but Socrates distances himself from ‘you prophets;’ he is the accused man by Meletus (“care”) for charges of corruption of the youth and impiety to Athenian gods (inventing new ones, not abiding the old ones); …
Do you see any parallel between Euthyphro and Socrates?
Euthyphro seems to take himself to be like Socrates: they both delve into divine matters. Also, Socrates seems to compare Meletus’ case against him (trying him before his mother, the city) to Euthyphro’s against his father.
The Plot: Why piety?
Socrates is in the court to answer the indictment for corruption/ impiety by Meletus.
Euthyphro is there to prosecute his father for murder.
The legal difference in Athens between indictment and prosecution:
Indictment is a public action to protect the state that can be brought by anyone.
Prosecution is a private charge that has to be brought by one of the persons involved. Prosecution for murder needed to be brought by a family member, if possible, because murder was a private matter. In earlier days there were blood feuds, while the development of law permitted a public, civil formula for arbitrating disputes, the case still had to be brought as a private action to free the family and city from blood-guilt.
What do we learn about the charges against Socrates?
Corrupting the Youth. Impiety. Evaluate his tone about these charges (i.e. does he seem angered, scared, careless, make an argument for your guess as to why?).
What do we learn about the charges Euthyphro is leveling?
Vs. Father for murder (subject had killed another). Evaluate his tone about these charges.
SO—Euthyphro believes people will accuse him of impiety, but he says that he is NOT doing anything impious (4e).
WHY is Euthyphro prosecuting his father for murder?
One of the father’s servants had gotten into a drunken rage and killed another. The father bound the killer and put him in a ditch and sent for religious advice from the priests or seers about what to do with the murderer. While the father waited, paying no attention to the bound man in the ditch, he died (from hunger and cold).
What do you think? Is Euthyphro being right, fair, just, pious?
What do you think of his personality, his attitude? Note the difference between the two, Euthyphro claims wisdom, Socrates claims ignorance (4e-5a).
Let’s work through their arguments:
Do they come to a definition of piety? How many definitions?
Definitions of the Pious:
1. Prosecuting wrongdoers (5d-e)
{Soc: but this is one of many pious actions…}
2. What the gods love [what is dear to the gods] (7a)
{Soc: but they don’t agree w/ each other}
3. What all the gods love (8b)
{Soc: defeat 10d: god-loved ≠ pious}
4. The part of justice that cares for the gods ((11d+) 12e)
{Soc: so pious act improves a god? Service aims to achieve something, what do gods aim to achieve by our service?}
5. The knowledge of how to trade with the gods through prayer and sacrifice (14(b)d-e)
{Soc: but what benefit do the gods get from our gifts?}
at the end of (5): —return to pious is what is pleasing to the gods—15b.
Definition 1: Piety is Prosecuting Wrongdoers (5d-e)
5c-d:
is piety one thing or is it different in each case?
Euthyphro: it is one thing.
Socrates: what is it then?
Euthyphro: what I am doing right now
5d-e: Pious = prosecute the wrong doer; Impiety = not prosecuting the wrong doer. He claims evidence that the law is so (for example, Zeus castrates his father).
Does he not begin the debate/conversation well? He offers an immediate definition backed up with arguments!
Socrates questions E’s argument… E insists on it… S questions other myths. Does this questioning of the myths make Socrates IMPIOUS? Or is it the literal nature he questions, does that save him from a charge of impiety against the gods?
What else is wrong with E’s argument?
Euthyphro is ignoring the FORMS? read 6 d-e
6d—S: What about other pious actions? So what makes X, Y, and Z all pious?
6d-e—What is Piety in itself? Its form?
Definition 2: Piety is What the Gods Love {what is dear to them} (7a)
(1) The pious and impious are opposites (7a).
(2) The gods are in conflict with each other (7b).
(3) What the gods are in conflict about are such matters as just, unjust,
beautiful, ugly, good, bad (7b-d).
(a) humans disagree about such matters (rather than number, heavy / light, big / small where there is a clear measure) and so gods would too, if they disagree about things.
--this offers us even a little insight into the “What is…” questions, those that we could ostensibly teach to a child may be easier for us to explicate than those things to which we cannot necessarily point…--
(4) They like what they consider beautiful, good, just and hate the opposites (7e).
(This is the key in next refutation)
(5) The same things are loved by some gods and hated by others (8a).
Therefore, the same things are both pious and impious (definition is of no help).
Definition 3: Piety is What ALL the Gods Love (8b)
(1) Where there is Xing and being Xed, something is Xed because of Xing
(2) Because the gods love the pious it is being loved, they do not love it because it is
being loved (the gods’ love makes the pious loved).
(3) But they love it because it is pious.
So, it is not pious because the gods love it but vice versa. Being loved by all the gods is a feature rather than the essence of the pious.
Analogously: all the gods eat ambrosia. Does it taste good because they eat it or do they eat it because it tastes good? Because they eat it, it is eaten. It does not taste good to them because it is eaten; it tastes good, they eat it and because they eat it, it is eaten.
Do you think this is a better definition? What about the argument? Is it based upon tricks of language or is it really revealing something to us?
Daedalus (11c)
Also referenced in Meno, 97D-E; legendary craftsman who made statues so real they were chained down.
Very similar to The Pygmalion Myth:
Pygmalion was the king of Cyprus and a sculptor who fell in love with one of his statues. He treated the ivory statue like a woman, spoke to it, named it lover, consort, etc. When the festival for Aphrodite came, he prayed to her to make his statue a real woman so he could marry it—she obliged. He returned from the festival to find his statue alive, they got married, had a child.
Back to the Arguments…
The 1st definition had to do with the prosecution of wrong doers—so, now our argument is going to move towards a definition that asks about justice and link up with the definition of the pious that asks what the gods love:
Definition 4: “…the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods…”
The pious is part of the just?
Here we get the idea of the Genus and Species…
This ought to be familiar from biology classes, where you learn that an oak is a species of the genus tree (Aristotle); Socrates is asking if the JUST is the GENUS of which the PIOUS is some SPECIES.
Does this help? If defining things is determining the genus and difference, then Socrates may have helped Euthyphro by giving him the genus of the pious. All he would have to do is find the difference (how is piety different than justice).
[Example of defining “the even” as “number divisible by two,” where “number” is the genus and “divisible by two” the difference.]
Does it make sense that piety is some part of justice?
Perhaps justice is obedience to law or lawfulness. Might piety be some part of lawfulness? Maybe there are laws about how we are to treat parents, country, and gods (perhaps these are “unwritten” laws).
But, let’s look backwards…
How do they get here specifically? Why talk about parts of justice?
Look at 11e: Socrates: “…see whether you think all that is pious is of necessity just.” Euthyphro responds that he believes so. So, Socrates reverses the terms:
If all that is pious is necessarily just
Is all that is just necessarily pious?
First, note that a just but not pious action may exactly be Euthyphro’s case against his father:
People should prosecute the guilty (this is just)
Sons should not betray/accuse their fathers (this is pious)
Euthyphro’s case may be just, but, depending upon the definition of piety, it may not be pious.
While this line of inquiry is not specifically addressed in the dialogue, is there support for it? Does it explain the urgency of the investigation? Is there justification or a hint of this doubt in the quote Socrates offers about shame (12b)?
What about this quote? It is not the clearest example for its ostensive purpose in determining how X may be a part of Y. Is the quote directed towards Euthyphro in a different aspect? Suggesting shame/fear as an explanation underlying Euthyphro’s egotistical claim to possess wisdom? Or, is the quote merely to illustrate how words can be reversed and lose their truth? There is no straight answer to this...
So…They decide (12d) that all piety is just, but not all justice is pious because the pious is part of justice.
So…which part of justice is it?
Socrates’ further explanation: What part of number is the even? The number that is divisible into two equal parts.
Euthyphro: (12e) “…the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice.”
Soc: (13a) What is “care”?
Piety is care of the gods like horse breeding is the care of horses.
(This example of care as benefit returns in his Apology; not all benefit (care), but those with specialized knowledge, thus, those trained to benefit X)
Thus: Care aims at the good and benefit of the object cared for.
So, is piety aimed at bettering and benefiting the gods?
E: NO.
S: Okay, what is care then?
E: Like slaves take care of their masters—service to the gods.
S: To achieve what goal does this service aim?
E: Many fine things. Note the tone!
S: How sum up “many fine things”?
E: That which is pleasing to the gods is pious. {{ OFF TRACK }}
SO—What happened to this definition?
Why did Euthyphro abandon it?
Why did he not answer the ‘service’s aim’ question?
THUS—the 4th Definition in short:
Piety is a part of justice
Which part?
Care of gods
What is care?
-benefit
-service
(Euthyphro changes track and abandons this definition).
What answer could have Socrates been looking for?
Either the pious is not merely a part of justice but the two are co-implicatory. Or, the pious is that part of justice that serves the gods through making ourselves and others more virtuous.
Can we make others better?
We can try by cross-examining them as Socrates does and similarly we can try to make ourselves better by straightening out our opinions. Only knowledge really puts our souls in order. But we can serve the gods by really trying as is Socrates (Socrates’ divine mission). Maybe virtue is knowledge and piety is the pursuit of knowledge, i.e., philosophy.
Definition 5: The knowledge of how to trade (give to / beg from) with the gods through prayer and sacrifice (14(b)d-e)
Socrates: {getting back ON TRACK} Is piety knowledge of Sacrifice and Prayer?
E: Yes.
S: So—piety is knowledge of giving to (i.e., sacrifice) and begging from (i.e., prayer) the gods?
E: Yes.
Notice how Socrates is working a new angle to get to the service/need question that Euthyphro refused in the last definition.
(14d) To beg correctly is to ask for what we need. To give correctly is to give what they need.
So…14e: Piety would be a trading skill between gods and men?
But... What is the benefit of gifts to the gods? (14e-15a)
(Sure, we get all good from them, but what do they get from measly us?)
E: Honor, Reverence, Gratitude (15a)
S: So, pious pleases them, but neither beneficial nor dear?
E: No, no, no… it is most dear to them.
S: So, we are back to the definition of the pious being that which is most dear to the gods (15b).
Socrates reminds Euthyphro that that already proved this to be logically inconsistent, and before he can begin all over again, Euthyphro says he has to leave.
---THE END---
Questions for reflection:
While we are left without a proper, truthful, fully correct definition, left with no answer, but in perplexity, has there been value to the process? Does Euthyphro profit from this discussion?
How does this illustrate the definition of wisdom as knowing what one does not know?
Do we see how hard it is when people’s interests conflict with their seeing the truth?
How is the theory of forms utilized in the dialogue?
How is it an excellent demonstration of Socrates’ elenchos?
How does the dialogue’s style (overall) support or further or obfuscate the content?](22_Platos_Euthyphro_files/shapeimage_1.png)
Soc: Do you then not realize now that you are saying that what is dear to the gods is the pious? Is this not the same as the god-loved? Or is it not?
Euth: It certainly is.
Soc: Either we were wrong when we agreed before, or, if we were right then, we are wrong now.
Euth: That seems to be so.
Soc: So we must investigate again from the beginning what piety is, as I shall not willingly give up before I learn this. ...
Euth: Some other time, Socrates, for I am in a hurry now, and it is time for me to go.
(Plato, Euthyphro, 15c-16).
Wednesday, August 22, 2012
Plato’s Euthyphro
