An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 

(published in 1748)

Deals with mostly the same concerns as his earlier A Treatise of Human Nature but in a style more informal, because, remember, he believed that the former was not well received because of its style over its content. 

Methodology of work:

While it can be said that the twelve sections logically follow, with the first six being concerned with empirical premises and the last six with the application of these premises…

We can also notice how the work is more like a collection of closely related essays as opposed to continuing one linear story line all the way through:

§ 1: Of the Different Species of Philosophy

§  2: Of the Origin of Ideas

§  3: Of the Association of Ideas

§  4: Skeptical Doubts Concerning the Operations of the Understanding (2 parts)

§  5: Skeptical Solution of the Doubts (2 parts)

§  6: Of Probability

§  7: Of the Idea of Necessary Connection (2 parts)

§  8: Of Liberty and Necessity (2 parts)

§  9: Of the Reason of Animals (Comparable to Man)

§  10: Of Miracles (2 parts)

§  11: Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State

§  12: Of the Academical or Skeptical Philosophy (3 parts)

Recall from his “An Abstract” that Hume (anonymously) proposed that he was going to do an exact, rigorous science of human nature and that the “author [i.e., Hume] proposes to anatomize human nature in a regular manner, and promises to draw no conclusions but where he is authorized by experience” (29).  Thus, we begin the Enquiry by exploring what this exact, rigorous science of human nature will look like:

(Note: quotations from page numbers refer to Anthony Flew’s edition, Chicago: Open Court, 1996)

§1: Of the Different Species of Philosophy

The Science of Human Nature may be treated two ways:

1) “Easy and Obvious Philosophy” argues that: Man is for Action:

Views humanity as influenced by taste and sentiment that preeminently values virtue and treats it most eloquently; draws observations from common life, stressing the feel of differences between virtue and vice, and will always be preferred by the public at large because it seems more agreeable, more useful, relating to life better.  Such philosophy touches the heart and affections and, thus, inspires and reforms people closer toward the model of perfection it describes.  Obviously, such has acquired more fame (look at Cicero!) and lasts longer since it is harder to make mistakes too consequential when one’s goal is to beautifully describe humanity’s common sense (53-5).

2) “Abstruse Philosophy” argues that: Man is for Reason: 

Views humanity’s endeavor as for cultivating understanding more than manners; seeks to find principles that regulate our understanding and sentiments and therefore places importance in securing the foundation of morality, reasoning, and criticism.  Its method is to proceed from particulars to general principles to original principles (essences); write abstractly and for the learned.  Such philosophy focuses on reason and does not translate, therefore, well into action; in other words, it is done outside of everyday life.  It does not reform the person or influence their behavior; instead, affections and passions destroy this thought and make this otherwise profound thinker a plebeian.  Such has had momentary reputation (look at Aristotle!), but it is easy to make mistakes in subtle reasoning and one leads to another (53-5).

The Philosopher: commonly found in but barely acceptable in the world because it is presumed they contribute nothing to the pleasure and advantage of society; s/he is distant from humanity, wrapped up in abstract and incomprehensible ideas.

The Ignorant: more despised by society than the philosopher because an enlightened age and society has no tolerance for those who don’t care for such matters. 

The Ideal: is between these extremes; has ability and taste for books, company, and business.  In conversation, the ideal has the discernment of being learned; in business, the ideal has integrity and precision born from wise philosophy. 

To cultivate this ideal character, valuable are essays of an easy style and manner that are a balance of the two types of philosophy –ones that inspire you to be better and a member of society.  “By means of such compositions, virtue becomes amiable, science agreeable, company instructive, and retirement entertaining” (56).

Humanity is:

Rational: by nature humanity is rational, science is like its food, but, our reason is so limited that it alone cannot satisfy us.  Note Hume’s precursor: “All men by nature desire to know” (Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 1, 980 a 22).

Social: by nature humanity is social, but not always so, sometimes one does not desire to be social.  Note Hume’s precursor: “Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal” (Aristotle, Politics, bk. 1, 1253 a 3-4).

Active: by disposition and by necessities of life, humanity must work (business and occupation) and the mind requires relaxation.

“It seems, then, that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to [the] human race…” (56).  In other words, humanity both is and is not entirely or exclusively rational, social, and active.  “Indulge your passion for science, says she [nature], but let your science be human, and such as may have a direct reference to action and society” (56).

“Be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man” (56).

But… most people so prefer type one of philosophy (active) they ignore or actively deride type two (rational).  So… Hume delineates:

Some Advantages to Rational Philosophy:

--Accuracy, without which the active would never know exact sentiments.

--Helps politicians have better foresight and subtlety managing power.

--Helps lawyers have better method and finer principles in his reasonings.

--Helps the everyday person have more discipline and act with more caution.

--There is a relation between increased stability of governments and accuracy of philosophy.

--Can also cause a gratification of an innocent curiosity (one of the few safe and harmless pleasures bestowed upon humanity).

The legitimate critique against Rational Philosophy:

Metaphysical obscurity (“...fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions…” (58))  as the cause of uncertainty and error. 

Thus… what we must do(!)…: 

“The only method of freeing learning, at once, from these abstruse questions [of metaphysics and superstition], is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects” (59).

“We must submit to this fatigue, in order to live at ease ever after: And must cultivate true metaphysics with some care, in order to destroy the false and adulterate” (59).

We will do true metaphysics: the study of being and knowledge in so far as we are doing a science of human nature!

Mental Geography:

It is remarkable that the operations of the mind (something so very intimate to each of us as human) seem so obscure (59)!  Ordering and distinguishing the operations of the mind is a very valuable endeavor; “And if we can go no further than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far…” (60). 

No Radical Skepticism:

The mind does have obviously distinct powers/faculties (we can distinguish, for example, between the will and understanding, and imagination and passions).  There are true and false propositions on these faculties and all other like subjects and within the bounds knowable by human understanding.  Further, we may, if very cautious, discover, in some degree, the “secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations” (61).  It is probable that one operation of the mind depends upon another and one can trace these dependencies backwards until one finds the most general and universal.

§ 2:  Of the Origin of Ideas

This section will be very familiar to us after reading Hume’s “An Abstract.”  Herein he elaborates the difference between actively having perceptions and recalling perceptions to mind, which is the distinction between Ideas/Thoughts and Impressions:

Perception: all mental events; divided into two classes or species by the different degrees of their force or vitality:

1) Impression: (i.e., have a perception): feel the heat or cold of the room, feel gratitude and pride for being in college, feel anxiety about our country’s economy, hit the table and feel pain in your hand, etc.  Impressions are lively perceptions; when we hear, see, feel, love, hate, desire, will (i.e., sensory, emotive, and volitional experience).

Note that having perceptions (impressions) implies a present state even if your perception is futurally oriented or influenced by memories of past perceptions; the having is in the present.

2) Idea/thought: (i.e., recall a perception): remember how cold it was last January, remember the pride or relief that you felt in graduating from high school, imagine how cold it will be this January, imagine how much it would hurt to break your foot.  Ideas are less forcible and less lively perceptions; conscious reflection on those perceptions we have already had.

Note that while one is in the present to recall perceptions, this recollection implies reintroducing past experience; yet, you can also anticipate future events by recalling past experienced perceptions.

So, after the definitions, Hume remarks that Ideas/Thought seem the most unbounded power of humanity; think of all the things we can imagine!  Real things, nonexistent things, theories of addition and theories of relativity.  While the body seems so limited to having what experiences it can right here and now, it is hungry or not, cold or hot, in pain or comfortable, the mind, in comparison can think of the rings of Saturn, that kid you loved in second grade, the name of your cat, your homework assignment for next week, and Descartes’ third meditation… conceivably, all at once!

But… really… all that we think is really very limited!  It is merely the compounding or transposing of various materials provided to thought by impressions!

“In short, all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment: the mixture and composition of these belongs alone to the mind and will.  Or, to express myself in philosophical language, all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones” (65).

Hume offers two examples to “prove” this:

(1) Compound ideas break into simple impressions:

Every thought, upon analysis, reveals to be composed of previously experienced feelings or sentiments.  For example, even the idea of God as infinitely intelligent, wise, and good Being is composed of various ideas drawn from reflection on the operations of our own minds and infinitely augmenting our experience of goodness and wisdom.

(2) No experience of X means no idea of X:

If one cannot have a certain type of sensation, i.e., a blind man cannot see, than that person will not have its dependent ideas, i.e., blind will not know color and deaf will not know sound.  If one simply has not (instead of cannot) had a certain sensation, this same result will follow, just in a milder degree; so, if one has always been in a safe environment, one will not expect bad things to happen, etc.

A Contradictory Phenomenon:Variations, esp. in color or sound

If one has distinct ideas of several shades of a single color (or several variations of tone of a single sound) but has never experienced one shade (or tone) in the series.  If one were to present all the shades (tones) minus the one unknown, one would perceive the missing one and could (likely) create its idea even without experience. 

“…and this may serve as proof that the simple ideas are not always in every instance, derived from the correspondent impressions; though this instance is so singular, that it is scarcely worth our observing, and does not merit that for it alone we should alter our general maxim” (66).

Thus…

Ideas are weak; they are easy to confuse and often induce mistakes.  But, impressions are so personal and strong, it is much harder to make mistakes.  So, being aware of how easy it is to make mistakes about ideas, when we suspect one is being used illegitimately (as philosophy always does!) we need to dissect them and investigate their origins in experience: “When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impressions is that supposed idea derived?”

He concludes with an investigation into our need to Re-evaluate “Innate Ideas:”

Those who rejected innate ideas (i.e., John Locke) were probably just arguing this same point: al ideas are copies of our impressions.

What is meant by Innate Idea?  If it means “natural,” then all perceptions or ideas of the mind are innate, i.e. natural, because they are not artificial, uncommon, or miraculous.  If it means “contemporary to our birth” (i.e., in us at birth), then the debate is frivolous: should we debate when thinking begins?  Why?

We need to remember that Locke, et al, use the word “idea” loosely; they mean variously any perception: sensation, passion, thought, etc.  If we keep the word this loose, then what do we mean when we say: self-love, resentment, or romantic passion is not innate?  Silly!  So, if we are strict about our definitions of impressions and ideas and consider innate to mean original, not copied, then we can truthfully say that it is impressions that are innate and not ideas (i.e., the opposite of Descartes…).

§  3: Of the Association of Ideas

There is a principle of connection between ideas in the mind.  When memory or imagination calls up an idea, one introduces another with a certain degree of method and regularity.  Even when our minds seem to wander the most, the chain of thoughts, upon investigation, shows some connection between the ideas.  Hume argues that this chain is intelligible between people and even between languages, so that different languages have a tendency to compound words and ideas in the same way. 

Hume argues that there are Three Principles to this connection:

1) Resemblance:

a picture makes us think of the original

          a proper name makes us think of s/he to whom the name belongs

2) Contiguity (continuity):

an apartment makes us think of the whole building

          St. Denis makes us think of Paris

          the Empire State Building makes us think of New York City

3) Causation (cause and effect):

a wound makes us think of the pain that follows from it

          a child makes us think of the parents

He entertains that there are other principles, perhaps “contrast” or others, but decides, no, that there are no other principles.  (Even contrast could be merely a mixture of resemblance and causation).

§  4: Skeptical Doubts Concerning

the Operations of the Understanding

(2 parts)

Up to this point, we have learned that all the “stuff” in the mind divided into: Impressions and Ideas.  Now, we are going to divide this category of Ideas (as Reason) into two divisions and then its activities into two divisions:

§4 Part 1: Reason: (1) Relations of Ideas and (2) Matters of Fact.

§4 Part 2: Activity of Reason: (1) Demonstrative Argument and (2) Moral Reasoning.

§§4-5 focus on coming to understand the foundations of matters of fact.  To this end, they explore three main topics: (1) Cause and effect (2) Custom or Habit and (3) Belief.

(outline for the first part of §4):

1: (a) Reason’s two divisions and (b) Cause and Effect

2: (a) How go from cause to effect (b) reason’s activities’ two divisions

(part 1):

All “objects” of human reason can be divided into two kinds:

Relations of Ideas: 

Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic.  These are discoverable by operations of thought alone without the need of external existence of the discovered.  (the perfect triangle or pi need not exist in nature to be legitimate as operations of thought—they are demonstratively or intuitively certain).

Matters of Fact:

Ascertained entirely differently; their legitimacy or truth is less certain.  Contraries are possible (we can have equally legitimate m.of.f: the sun will rise tomorrow and the sun will not rise tomorrow—its truth or falsity cannot be demonstrated like a mathematical problem). 

“It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity, to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact, beyond the present testimony of our senses, or the records of our memory” (72).

“All reasonings concerning matters of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect” (72). 

Using Cause and Effect, we can go beyond the evidence of memory (think recalling perceptions, Ideas) and senses (think having perceptions, Impressions).   

If you ask someone why they believe any matter of fact that is not currently present, i.e., one is not currently having an impression of it, the person will give a reason why they think it to be, even while not immediately there. 

Hume’s examples:

Ask one if his friend is in the country or in France?  The person will give a reason, another fact, to support one or the other: he is in France because I received a letter from him. 

A person on a desert island finds a watch and concludes the fact that there must have been other people on this island before him. 

In both examples, we make a presumption: that there is a connection between the present fact and that which is inferred from it. 

Otherwise, the inference would be so precarious!    (is this an argument? Precarious inferences?)

Further examples:

Hearing a voice (an articulate one spewing rational discourse, no less) in a dark room assures us of the presence of another person. 

Why?  Because the voice and discourse are effects of a human as cause.

And all other like reasonings, he argues, are likewise founded on the relation of cause and effect. 

So… how do we know cause and effect?  “I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation [i.e. cause and effect] is not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other” (73). 

Thus, the rest of the section is concerned with trying to demonstrate C&E presumptions are neither from reason nor experience.

For example: Adam (as in first man) had perfect rational capacities, he could not know from observing water that it could suffocate him nor that fire would burn him.  These are things not apparent in the sensory presentation of water or fire (in fact, a lot of presentations re: each could suggest they are very good, not potentially deadly).

It is easier to show that such things do not give anything for reason to go on to deduce C&E.  But, we think, then, Adam simply experiences water or a burn and then understands C&E, but it is not this easy.  For example, how do we know that milk and bread are proper nourishments for humans and not for lions?

Experience can teach us fire burns, but, “…the effect is totally different than the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it” (74).  So… we have an impression of fire and an impression of burn; reason/understanding puts these together in recollection so that we know fire burns; the knowledge was born from experience.  But, two things: (1) nothing about fire in and of itself is a burn; they are totally different; (2) in the formula if we touch fire then we get burnt, the if and then as conjoined is neither implicit in the experience nor in the reasoning about the experience. 

“In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause” (75).

Note the jab at Descartes (Med. 5) on p.76: “Nor is geometry… ever able to remedy this defect, or lead us to knowledge of ultimate causes.

(part 2):

Flow of the argument:

What is the nature of all our reasonings concerning matters of fact?

Cause and Effect.

What is the foundation of all our reasonings and conclusions concerning cause and effect?

Experience.

What is the foundation of all conclusions from experience?

This is a hard one…

Proposal: our conclusions from the experience of cause and effect are not founded on reasoning or any process of the understanding. 

We are ignorant of the natural “powers” or principles that lead from ideas (given by experience) to predictions of future effects:

“As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance: but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know, may by only in appearance similar; this is the main question on which I would insist” (78).

In other words:

“I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect,”

does not equal

“I foresee, that other objects, which are, in appearance, similar, will be attended with similar effects” (78). 

Sure… we infer the latter from the former, but… this inference is not from reasoning… not intuitive… something (some medium) is required between the two…

I don’t know what… so, let us delineate the branches of knowledge:

All reasoning (divides into two classes):

1) Demonstrative Reasoning:  concerning relation of ideas

2) Moral Reasoning: concerning matters of fact and existence

There is no demonstrative argument to explain the inference from what is to what will be.  (demonstration shows “this, here!” and the future can be more variable, X or its opposite Y could happen, both cannot be demonstrated at once…?)

Yet, neither is there any argument from moral reasoning!  It would be a circular argument.

“In reality, all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural objects, and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from such objects” (80).

But… the philosopher is more curious; yes, from experience, but precisely what foundation is this inference grounded upon (80-1)? 

The inference is neither intuitive nor demonstrative… of what nature is it, then? 

If you say “experiential,” you beg the question… (81).

If you say “repetition” or “practice,” you mistake the question (he asks for foundations)… (82).

Just because we do not know the answer does not mean there is no answer (82).

“It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants—nay, infants, nay, even brute beasts—improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them…. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion [fire burns] by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that argument; nor have you any pretense to refuse so equitable a demand” (82).

§  5: Skeptical Solution of the Doubts

(2 parts)

(outline):

1: (a) skepticism (b) custom (c) either/or (d) error

2: (a) imagination (b) belief (c) presense

(part 1)

The best method of philosophy by which to proceed is in Academic or Skeptical philosophy:

“Nothing, therefore, can be more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine indolence of the mind, its rash arrogance, its lofty pretensions, and its superstitious credulity” (85). 

And, do not fear skepticism; it will never be so radical to destroy positive answers because nature will always see to it we do not take it too far (even the most skeptical philosopher puts her feet our on the floor and unconsciously expects to find it there when she awakens… avoids walking into walls even if the senses could be deceiving one that it really is a wall). 

Suppose a perfectly rational and capable man was brought into the world suddenly: he would perceive a succession of objects and events; yet, he will never perceive anything more.  Never through reason alone or via the senses alone discover the principle of cause and effect.  The conjunction of events in the continuous succession could be entirely arbitrary; there is nothing in the events alone to see or deduce causal connection (85).

This man acquires a lot more experience and now infers future events based upon past events; however, he has not acquired this knowledge from reason or experience alone, nevertheless, he is absolutely compelled to believe it to be true (86).

So… what is this principle that explains the inference?

Custom (aka Habit) (86).

“For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding, we always say, that this propensity is the effect of Custom” (86).

This is not the ultimate reason, of course, but simply the principle of human nature… maybe we can go no further… 

“All inferences from experience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of reasoning” (87).

In other words: we neither “see” cause and effect as a principle nor do we reason it out; but, to hold that all ideas are from impressions (all knowledge is from experience), then cause and effect needs an experiential foundation; so, it does, via: CUSTOM.

Presuming EITHER reason OR experience is a false either/or (87).

All the arguments of the sciences which claim their principles to be fully rational are really, if properly traced back, grounded in experience and observation.  The only way they differ from maxims of pure experience is that the sciences require some through process, some reflection, between the experience and principle to distinguish its circumstances and trace its consequences (88).

Observation gives us lots of maxims.  Without practice, time, and thought, though, he will make many errors enacting these maxims (88).

A ‘rational animal’ is not foolproof or even close without experience:  “Custom, then, is the great guide of human life.  It is that principle alone which renders our experience useful to us, and makes us expect, for the future, a similar train of events with those which have appeared to us in the past” (89).

There needs to be a fact present to the memory or senses or else a chain of reasoning is mere hypothesis.  “All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a customary conjunction between that and some other object” (89).  Further, in other words: custom lets us infer from past experience to future events and to believe such really exists or will be… Natural instinct permits custom and belief, not reasoning (90).

We must pause and further examine the nature of this BELIEF and of the CUSTOMARY CONJUNTION upon which it is derived. 

(part 2)imagination and belief

Nothing is more free than the imagination; even while it cannot surpass what is given it by experience, nonetheless, it can compound these and mix them infinitely (90-1).

Now, because our imagination can do so much with the data from experience, how do we know what is fiction and what it to be believed?  What is the difference between the imaginary story imagination gives us and the truthful one? 

It is not in any idea… it is in sentiment.  There is a sentiment (feeling) added to belief that that differentiates fiction from the believable.  The sentiment must be excited by nature and arise from the particular situation of the mind (91). 

“Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses, it immediately, by the force of custom, carries the imagination to conceive that object, which is usually conjoined to it; and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment, different from the loose reveries of the fancy.  In this consists the whole nature of belief” (91).

A sentiment differentiates the conception that we believe and the one we reject.  With all matters of fact, we can conceive an opposite; without an added sentiment there is no reason we would assent to one conception over the other (91).

Hume’s example: I see a billiard ball rolling towards another one.  I can conceive it hitting the other and stopping.  I can also conceive it hitting the other and making the other roll.  I believe the latter will be the case.  That conception has an added sentiment to it that differentiates it from all the other factual options that could happen; we believe only one of these.

A definition of this sentiment is difficult to impossible (91).

The name of this sentiment is: BELIEF (91-2).

We may attempt a description of it:

“…belief is nothing more but a vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain” (92). 

It is “…that act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and imagination” (92). 

What, then, is the imagination?  And, how does it relate to belief?

“The imagination has the command over all its ideas, and can join and mix and vary them, in all the ways possible.  It may conceive fictitious objects with all the circumstances of place and time… But as it is impossible that this faculty of imagination can ever, of itself, reach belief, it is evident that belief consists not in the peculiar nature or order of ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their feeling to the mind” (92). 

And, once more, what is belief?

“…belief is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination.  It gives them more weight and influence; makes them appear of greater importance; enforces them in the mind; and renders them the governing principle of our actions” (92).

“These ideas [I believe] take faster hold of my mind, than ideas of an enchanted castle” (93).

“…the sentiment of belief is nothing but a conception more intense and steady than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, and that this manner of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses” (93).

Note that he remarks here that he believes that he can also find analogous mental operations in our quest for more basic principles (of knowledge, et al) (93).

He has already established the three principles governing the Association of Ideas: Resemblance, Contiguity, and Causation. 

Now he is going to look at when these principles become more intense when the cause of the idea is present to the mind (93).

In other words, his question is: “Does it happen, in all these relations, that, when one of the objects is presented to the senses or memory, the mind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a steadier and stronger conception of it than what otherwise it would have been able to attain?” (93).

In essence, yes, immediacy intensifies the correlative association.  Seeing a picture of a friend may trigger a thought of the friend himself.

Resemblance: Seeing this picture makes the thought stronger as well as intensifying all other triggered sentiments about the friend (as opposed to, let’s say, simply thinking of him without the picture spurring one’s thought). 

Hume argues that this is especially demonstrated in the role of ritual and image in religion: the ceremony, icons and other art, saints and other statues, mummified remains or relics of holy people, etc. all these sensible things enliven one’s religious feelings (94-5).

Contiguity:  Thinking of any thing makes our minds think of what it is part of, but even more intensely when in the presence of the actual object. 

Coming home after being away for a long time intensifies all of our corollary ideas of home (94).

And, in all these cases of intensified association, we note that belief is presupposed, otherwise the relation of ideas would have no effect upon us (95).

“But what is there in this whole matter to cause such a strong conception, except only a present object and a customary tradition to the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed to conjoin with the former?”  (96). 

This seems to be a “pre-established harmony” between nature and the succession of our thoughts; it is custom by which various thoughts are associated one to the other and this is intensified by the sentiment of belief annexed to the flow of thoughts.  When the object is present the process becomes all the more vivid. 

§  6: Of Probability

Locke divides arguments into demonstrative and probable.

Hume divides arguments into demonstrations, proofs, and probabilities.

Proofs:

Arguments from experience that leave no room for doubt or opposition.

Chance:

There is no such thing technically.

Ignorance of the cause of any event gives rise to belief or opinion.

By nature, it renders all particular events entirely equal (in potential).

Probability:

Arises from superiority of chances on one side or another (as superiority increases, probability proportionately increases) and instills or affirms belief.

Belief:

When one event occurs more frequently than others the mind is led to it more often and forms a firmer and stronger conception of an object than what attends fictions from imagination.  Influences passions and affections and begets a reliance or security on its future repeated occurrence.  In other words, the concurrence of results founds belief. 

This affirms what he gave us in §5 part 2 as a description of belief:

“…belief is nothing more but a vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain” (92). 

Probability of causes, chance, and belief founded this same way (99). 

Some causes are uniform (fire always burns, water always suffocates); some causes are less regular (rhubarb doesn’t always purge, opium doesn’t always act as soporific, i.e., induce sleep).

“Being determined by custom to transfer the past to the future, in all our inferences; where the past has been entirely regular and uniform, we expect the even with the greatest assurance, and leave no room for any contrary supposition” (99). 

When different effects follow from similar causes, we still employ probability in thinking of the future results.  We assign different weights of probability to the different possible effects (99-100).

§  7: Of the Idea of Necessary Connection

(2 parts)

(part 1):

Remember that back in §4 part 2 Hume divided all reasoning into two classes:

1) Demonstrative Reasoning:  concerning relation of ideas

2) Moral Reasoning: concerning matters of fact and existence

§4 part 1 explained that relations of ideas concerned mathematical ideas and matters of fact were those other ideas far more ambiguous and permitted contraries. 

Now, Hume begins §7 again differentiating Mathematical Sciences (relations of ideas and demonstrative reasoning) from Moral Sciences (matters of fact and moral reasonings) (101). 

Mathematical Sciences seem easier because their ideas are sensible, thus, they are clear and determinate.  Their objects can be defined or presented to the senses (i.e., we cannot mistake a triangle for a circle).

Moral Sciences, however, the “finer sentiments of the mind, the operations of the understanding, the various agitations of the passions” are far easier to mistake; they are distinct from one another, but we mistake them because reflection has not the power to recall the original object (101).

But, really, both sciences can be equally distinct (101-2).

“The chief obstacle, therefore, to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms.  The principal difficulty in the mathematics is the length of inferences and compass of thought, requisite to the forming of any conclusion” (102).

Methodology: The most uncertain area within Moral Reasoning concerns the definitions of: power, force, energy, or necessary connexion (102).

Definitions: of course, all ideas are copies of impressions; we cannot think what we have not felt.  Complex ideas, however, can be defined and those definitions are enumerations of the parts or simple ideas that compose them.  These simples are strong and sensible; they admit not of ambiguity and can illuminate other ideas as well (102-3).

    Power or Necessary Connexion:

       --think of power akin to Nietzsche’s will to power;        

        Schopenhauer’s cosmic will; Hinduism’s karma; Aristotle’s

        motion inherent to the soul; etc.

Where does the idea of Power or Necessary Connexion come from? 

(1) Impression from Outside? 

(2) Impression from bodily Inside?

(3) Impression from internal strong endeavor? 

(4) Impression from mentally Inside? 

(5) Divine Power?

(1)

Scrutinize its impression: for example, the billiard balls: when one hits the other and the other begins to roll, what appears to us as outward sense is that one event seems to follow the other.  The mind feels no inward sense or impression: there is nothing in any instance of cause and effect that suggests the existence of power or force.

If there was such a power, we would be able to deduce the effect from the first appearance of a cause (actually deduce it, not presume it via custom/habit).

“In reality, there is no part of matter, that does ever, by its sensible qualities, discover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it could produce any thing, or be followed by any other object, which we could denominate its effect” (104).  But… there is an ambiguity in Hume!  Is it that there is no power, or, simply, that we can never know such power?  Cf. top ¶ of p.104.

Conclusion: So… we never get an interior impression of the idea of power/necessary connexion from the outside.

(2)

So… do we derive the idea of power from internal (bodily) reflection?  For example, we feel results from an act of volition (I will my leg to move and it does)… Perhaps!

“This idea, then, is an idea of reflection, since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind, and on the command which is exercised by will, both over the organs of the body and faculties of the soul” (105). 

This inner idea of power:

-can only be known by experience

-never be foreseen in cause

We know that bodily motion follows from command of will… but… how?  We cannot know because:

1st: union of soul and body most mysterious

2nd: our power to move body varies dramatically (to move tongue easier than moving liver) (105).

3rd: immediate object of power is not actual object moved: will leg to move and you actually move all your muscles and tendons and nerves, etc. (106).

Conclusion:

So… “…our idea of power is not copied from any sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when we give rise to animal motion, or apply our limbs to their proper use and office” (106-7).

(3)

So… the idea of power does not come from outside nor from reflection on body… so, does it come from an internal strong endeavor, an inner power or force to overcome?  Hume uses the term “Nisus”: (latin) “striving after a goal,” or “strong endeavor.”

But, gives us two reasons why this not it:

1st: we attribute power to many things without the mind for this strong exertion.

2nd: there is no connection between the sentiment of endeavor to the event (107).

(4)

So… the idea of power does not come from outside, nor from reflection on body, nor an internal strong endeavor… so, does it come from the idea of the ‘power of the mind’?

No, likely for the same reasons:

1st: when we know a power, we know the circumstance in the cause that produced the effect (thus, we would certainly know such powers, not question them).

2nd: we do not rationally know the limits of the mind over itself and the body; we only know these experientially.  Our authority over our passions is weaker than over ideas (so, how could we know limits of power(?)).

3rd: self-command is different at different times; we know this through experience; where then is the power of which we would be conscious? (108).

Volition is an act of mind.  We are acquainted with it.  There is nothing in volition that is like the creative power we presuppose links effects to causes (or, causes effects) (108).

(5)

Surprises in particular cause us to presume there is a power (an “invisible intelligent principle,” deus ex machina, 109).  But, if we think this through, we see that the idea of power is most unintelligible; it is only though experience with the constant conjunction of objects that provokes us to think of connexion… Nonetheless, we so easily fall prey to thinking a religious power as cause behind all events (109-111).

Hume’s Counter Argument to divine power:

1st: Our reason is much too weak to ever know that there is a divine power.

2nd: We are ignorant of how bodies act upon each other and more so ignorant of how minds (let alone supreme mind) acts upon bodies (111-112).  (we don’t know idea in us, how the hell could we know the idea in God?)

And, finally, the rise in discussion of inertia (vis inertiae, the power of inertia) does not offer anything to this discussion (112).

(part 2):

Conclusion:  In vain we search for the impression behind our idea of a causal power or necessary connexion between causes and events.

We cannot find this impression in:

(1) outward bodies

(2) operations of mind on bodies

(3) authority of will

Thus… events seemed conjoined, but we can never prove them connected.

“And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life” (113). 

But…

There remains one source not yet examined: the connexion of causes and events in the mind produced by habit or custom. 

“This connexion, therefore, which we feel in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion” (114).

This is absolutely the origin of the idea of “power;” you will find no other.  “When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in out thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other’s existence…” (115).

Therefore, we are able to give a “definition,” now, of a:

CAUSE:  “…an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second… where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed” (115).

--note the editor’s footnote that the second formulation does not equal the first and in fact introduces an essentialism the first formulation properly lacks.  

Another definition follows on the next page:  Cause: “an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other” (116).

These aren’t very good, he admits, but we can do no better because “We have no idea o this connexion, nor even any distinct notion what it is we desire to know, when we endeavor at a conception of it” (116).

Nice summary of his conclusion on p.117:

“Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment; and where we cannot find any impression, we may be certain that there is no idea.  In all single instances of the operation of bodies or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression, nor consequently can suggest any idea, of power or necessary connexion.  But when many uniform instances appear, and the same object is always followed by the same event; we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connexion.  We then feel a new sentiment or impression, to wit, a customary connexion in the thought or imagination between one object and its usual attendant and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for” (117).

And Hume concludes saying that, essentially, if he offered more comment on this, he would further obscure it instead of clarifying it (117-8). 

§  8: Of Liberty and Necessity (2 parts)

(part 1):

Some topics of inquiry evade firm answer.  Others, however, like those that “regard any subject of common life and experience” can be answered and they are only still debated because of “ambiguous expressions” that leave room for doubt (119).  Liberty and Necessity have been two of these subjects still debated but capable of answers if only we discern “a few intelligible definitions [we] would immediately have put an end to the whole controversy” (120).

Hume begins with the Doctrine of Necessity (120):

We presume that there is such a thing as necessity, especially, a necessary force that actuates matter.  But, we must examine from where do we get this idea when we apply it to bodies?  We would never have the idea at all if everything was always in flux and there was no resemblance or repetition of events. 

“Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observable in the operations of nature, where similar objects are constantly conjoined together, and the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other” (121). 

Were it not for constant conjunction and consequent inference we would have no idea of necessity or connexion (121).

Conjunction:

-There is a great uniformity amongst humanity across time and place;

-Human nature is the same in principles and operations;

-Same motives produce same actions;

-Same events follow from same causes;

-The sources of action and enterprise: ambition, avarice, self-love, vanity, friendship, generosity, and public spirit;

If a traveler brought us stories of humanity so very, very different, we would call it a lie: “So readily and universally do we acknowledge a uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body” (122).  Diverse experience acts as a guide; teaches us of these regular inclinations of humanity (122-23).  “But were there no uniformity in human actions, and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous, it… [would be] impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind…” (123).  Humanity will never be identical, but merely uniform (123).

There are, of course, exceptions but they do not prove conjunction wrong: “From a maxim that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes” (124).  This is demonstrated in bodies and in the actions and volitions of humans: “The internal principles and motives may operate in a uniform manner, notwithstanding these seeming irregularities…” (125).  This experienced uniformity is also the source from which we draw inferences (126).  Example from mutual dependence amongst humans (126) and lessons from philosophy, history, politics, morals, and criticism (how could we have these studies and deem them valuable were there not a uniformity amongst human action and nature (126-7)?  Continued long list of examples...

Conclusion:

“If we examine the operations of the body, and the production of effects from their causes, we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular objects are constantly conjoined together, and that the mind is carried, by a customary transition, from the appearance of one to the belief of the other” (128).

Nonetheless… some still have a strong propensity to think they can see deeper into nature and discern something like a necessary connexion between cause and effect…  since they cannot feel any connection between cause and effect, they think that necessity is different between material things than mental things…  (128-9).  But, once we convince them we know nothing more of causation than conjunction and consequent inference, we can all see there is no difference in necessity between different (material and mental) causes (129).

(1) Most philosophers mistake Liberty and Necessity because they start thinking by looking into faculties of the soul, influences of understanding, and operations of will (i.e., the rationalist side of things) instead of starting from most basic experience of bodies and matter (i.e., experience), in which it is far easier to see that causation and necessity simply proceeds from constant conjunction of objects and the consequent inference of the mind from one to another (129).

(2) Another reason for the (mistaken) prevalence of the Doctrine of Liberty (130):

A false sensation or seeming experience of liberty or indifference in our actions.  Necessity is not in the agent but in s/he who considers the action… in the thinking of or knowing, not the doing.  “…as liberty, when opposed to necessity, is nothing but the want of that determination, and a certain looseness or indifference, which we feel, in passing, or not passing, from the idea of one object to that of any succeeding one” (130); in other words, we feel this liberty/indifference in acting, not in reflecting on action.

To prove this:i.e. clarify the definition!!!

“For what is meant by liberty, when applied to voluntary actions?  We cannot surely mean that actions have so little connexion with motives, inclinations, and circumstances, that one does not follow with a certain degree of uniformity from the other, and that one affords no inference by which we can conclude the existence of the other” (131).

Thus, “By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may” (131).  In other words, people still argue and presume liberty to exist but they are using the term differently than Hume intends, and actually their argument has no bearing on his case. 

Necessity, for Hume, is constancy (132). Thus, if liberty is contrasted to necessity, then liberty equals chance and does not exist.  If liberty is contrasted to constraint, then there is no argument (132).

(part 2):

Dangerous to turn to religion and morality in arguments (132).  Nonetheless, necessity and liberty are consistent and essential to moral argumentation (133).

Definitions of Necessity (conformable to those of Cause):

(1) Constant conjunction of like objects

(2) Inference of understanding from one object to another

Laws are founded on reward and punishment; it is presupposed these are fundamental principles and have regular and uniform influence and regularly produce the good and prevent the evil.  Thus, we are viewing these as cause to those effects (133).

Criminality:  If one denies causes, than one must say a person is as pure as a newborn immediately after committing a horrific act because their action could not cause their character to be evil and no one could argue that wickedness of action is done by those of depraved character (134).

“…repentance wipes off every crime, if attended with a reformation of life and manners.  How is this to be accounted for?  But by asserting that actions render a person criminal merely as they are proofs of criminal principles in the mind; and when, by an alteration of these principles, they cease to be just proofs, they likewise cease to be criminal.  But, except upon the [mistaken] doctrine of necessity, they never were just proofs, and consequently were never criminal” (134). 

The same arguments can be used to show that Liberty is required for Morality (134-5).

An opposing view could argue from the religious dimension against Liberty, but this leads to an absurd argument that bad actions implicated God’s guilt.  No one arguing from this position would want this consequence (135). 

This argument has two parts (136):

(1) if human action can be traced up necessary chain to God, they can never be criminal because He is perfect;

(2) if they are criminal actions, then God cannot be perfect and must be the source of evil.

(1) is detailed (136-7); in essence: on the whole, all is perfect even if it seems wretched.

(2) is detailed (137-8); in essence: this argument would have to revert to unknowing of the mysteries and be plunged to doubt, uncertainty, and contradiction.

§  9: Of the Reason of Animals (Comparable to Man)

All reasoning about matters of fact are founded on analogy, “which leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result from similar causes” (139).

For similar causes, the analogy is perfect and inference drawn from it certain.

For dissimilar causes, the analogy is less perfect and inference drawn from it less certain.

Anatomical observations formed from one animal can be transferred by analogy to other animals.  So, if we could understand the operations of understanding or the origin and connection of the passions in humans as analogical to other animals, the truth of our argument for the human faculties would be all the stronger (139).

(1)  It seems evident both animals and humans learn from experience and infer that same events will follow from same causes.  Through this principle, both animals and humans learn many things as their experiences expand. 

The ignorance of the youth of both animals and humans is sharply contrasted to the learnings of the elders of both (139-40).  Discipline and education through punishment and reward especially demonstrate this principle for both animals and humans (140).

(2)   Inferences are NOT the product of reasoning;

This is obvious to not be in animals b/c of their imperfect faculty of understanding

Likewise, in children, in most people as they are in the everyday, in most philosophers as they are in natural attitude, nor are the vulgar (140).

Like animals, who learn from observation and instinct, we, too, learn this way (even if we rarely consider it so) (141).  Thus, his un-stated conclusion suggests that there IS a great similarity between human knowledge and animal knowledge.  This is an unusual response for a philosopher of his time, and even today!

Hume concludes with a list of Nine Reasons for Differences between Humans:

i.e., if we are so uniform… how come there are intellectual differences between people?

(1) memory and observation skills differ between people

(2) some better comprehend the whole (so as to better understand when complications in causal chains)

(3) some better able to carry causal chains farther

(4) few can think for too long without encountering error

(5) some have better attention to subtlety for effects’ involvement in other factors

(6) forming maxims from particulars is nice but easy to make mistakes

(7) ease to invent analogies makes better reason-er from analogies

(8) biases effect some more than others

(9) read and discuss more and have a broader set of experience

§  10: Of Miracles

(2 parts)

(part one):

Hume reviews Dr. John Tillotson’s argument against the “real presence” of Christ in the Eucharist, praising the argument for its strength (against the credulity of the editor, who points out the argument is poor) (143).

“Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses…” (143).

Because… the evidence they claim is weak to begin with and then transmitted through the disciples.  Their testimony is weak; all testimony in general is weaker than the evidence of our own senses (143).

A summation of Hume’s position, that we are familiar with now, is presented on 144 in regards to the new topic to which it is applied, religious miracles/religious truth:

“Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact; it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is apt to lead us into errors” (144).

Because… mistakes happen… “All effects follow now with like certainty from their supposed causes” (144).  Therefore… “A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence” (144).

This evidence of miracles commonly includes witness testimony…

“Witness” comes from the Old English word “wit,” “knowledge.”

So, a witness is a person with a knowledge of something.  If you recall at the beginning of the semester, in defining “philosophy” as the love of wisdom, I differentiated wisdom from knowledge because, typically, knowledge is intentional, that is, to be knowledge of something.

For example, a witness to a miracle has knowledge of the miracle.  When they report their knowledge, they are giving testimony to their knowledge.  “Testimony” is from the Latin testimonium, evidence or proof, where testis is witness and monium signifies an action, condition, or state of being; implicitly religious, it initially designated the Ten Commandments.

But… as Hume notes, a witness may have a knowledge while another has another knowledge… i.e., we can recall the difference between Universal and Relative truth… we admit that often several witnesses to a single crime report seeing different things; that a witness imparts his/her own truth—i.e., it is relative.  But… this contradicts the demand we make upon testimony to be the True Truth, the Whole Truth—i.e., universal.  But… Let us move to what Hume says…

For Hume, witness testimony is common, useful, and even necessary.  Testimony is not founded on cause and effect, although, still operates by our “veracity of human testimony” being tied to the “usual conformity of facts to the reported of witnesses” (145).

The evidence from witnesses is derived from past experience; it varies from proof to probability (146).  We frequently hesitate to accept the testimony of others (146).

Hume lists many reasons for when we doubt:

Oppositions from contrary testimony,

Contrarieties between character or number of witnesses,

Contrarieties from manner of delivering testimony,

A combination of above,

Suspicion for all matters of fact,

Witnesses contradict,

Few witnesses or unreliable witnesses,

Interest in what they affirm,

Deliver testimony in halting manner,

Deliver testimony in violent assuredness,

Etc. (146).

We place credit in witnesses’ testimony not because of a connexion a priori between testimony and reality, but because we are accustomed to finding a conformity between them (146). 

Convoluted Examples of Cato and Indian with Freezing Water (147-8).

Something may surprise us: “Such an event, therefore, may be denominated extraordinary, and requires a pretty strong testimony, to render it credible to people … but still it is not miraculous, nor contrary to uniform experience of the course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the same” (147-8).

Hume defines miracle:  “A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined” (148).

“Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature” (148).  Evidence for a law of nature is as strong or stronger than evidence against law of nature.

He explores what might be a miracle (148-9).

Hume again defines miracle: “A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular violation of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent” (149).

The consequence: There is no testimony sufficient to establish the truth/knowledge of a miracle (149).  If some one tells me he witnessed a miracle, I weight the probability of his miracle against the probability that he is deceiving me or he has been deceived himself.  The least likely must be rejected, which means that deception is more probable (149).

(part two):

No miracle may be affirmed on the testimony of a witness (four reasons):

1)  History can provide no instance of a miracle being attested to by a sufficient number of people who have good sense, education, and learning (so as to assure us of their less likelihood for and of deception) (150).

2) 

a) A maxim: we commonly believe that things that we have no experience of will be generally like those things we have had experience of.  The most usual is the most probable.  It is safe to reject what is very unusual and incredible. 

b) Surprises generally please us, bring wonder, and make us desire to want to believe them.  “But, if the spirit of a religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common sense…” (151).

c)  Eloquence often permits us no rational distance by which to evaluate its content; it captivates us and makes us believe foolishness (151).

d)  Telling such stories also brings us pleasure, and we are often inclined to repeat the oddities that we hear (152).

3)

a) Miracles are most often reported from lands with many ignorant and barbaric people (152).

b) “But it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all ages” (152). 

Examples of people who lie (false prophets, etc.) (152-3).

4)  Testimony itself can destroy testimony of miracles.  There are many religions, each religion has its own miracles to justify it; when one religion overthrows another, it also over throws the testimony of those miracles.  This shows the frailty of all testimony, for it to be so easily overthrown and the frailty of proving any miracles (154). 

He then offers historical examples of the best attested to miracles (155-157) and then to the case of the greatest number of miracles attributed to a single person (Abbé Paris) (157-158), and then the case of the Molinists, who tried to discredit the miracles (158-160) and how even they ended acceding to the miracles of the niece of Pascal (160-161).

But… nonetheless… we still have testimony offered for miracles…

“The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which favours the passion of the reporter…. But what greater temptation than to appear a missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven?” (161).  And it is difficult to prove/disprove things when they happen in the past (162).

Nonetheless:   (an early conclusion):

“Upon the whole, then, it appears, that no testimony for any kind of miracle has ever amounted to a probability, much less to a proof….  It is experience only, which gives authority to human testimony; and it is the same experience, which assures us of the laws of nature.  When, therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do but subtract one from the other, with that assurance which arises firm the remainder… [i.e., look for the greater probability] …

…But… “…with regard to all popular religions, [this] amounts to an entire annihilation; and therefore we may establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion” (163).

Sure… there may be miracles… but we cannot prove them with testimony (163).  Even if one may argue that miracles are from the Almighty, and we cannot know the Almighty, so who are we to say they are not true and knowable?… still, we know what we can experience, from what we experience we cannot know miracles (164).

Hume cites and upholds Francis Bacon on this same sort of point (164-5).  Then rejects those who try to prove religion by reason (i.e. Descartes) (165).  Foolish!!  Says Hume.  Our religion is founded on FAITH not REASON (165).  This argument against knowing miracles holds just as valid against prophecies (166). 

§  11: Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State

Hume says he had a great conversation with a friend that loves skeptical paradoxes and will relate the conversation.

It began with Hume remarking on the “single good fortune of philosophy” that if given complete liberty that it requires, it flourishes with opposition of beliefs and arguments and has enjoyed freedom and toleration without restriction by religion or law, except a few incidents, like Protagoras’ banishment and Socrates’ death sentence (167-8).

Friend replies: But, bigotry flourishes in those conditions, too, as the offspring of philosophy (168).

Hume: Not philosophy… Politics!

Friend: Bigotry arises from passions and prejudices. 

Hume: Then suppose Epicurus was charged by Athens; make a speech supporting Epicurus (based on and appealing to reason).

Friend’s Speech (in the Voice of Epicurus):

1)

Differentiate Politics (common good, matters of commonwealth) and Philosophy (as speculative study).  “We shall only enquire how far such questions [of philosophy] concern the public interest” (169).  In other words, public affairs should concern themselves with only what affects public good and not with speculative matters that do not harm the common good.

2)

The religious (here, they become the voice of the politics, for they are the side bring charges against philosophy) argue that there is an ordered universe and that this necessitates the existence of an omnipotent, etc., creator (169-70).

Friend argues that he need not prove or disprove this argument [Cf. Hume’s Dialogue on Natural Religion if interested in this], but, that he only needs to show that philosophy arguing otherwise than the religious stance does not harm the public and actually advances principles based upon the same reason that the religious folk employ and thus must condone (170).

3)

The argument for intelligent design employs Cause and Effect reasoning!!!  The effect is the ordered world from which they infer backwards to an intelligent creator. 

4)

Friend, parsing Hume, “When we infer any particular cause from an effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect” (170). 

So… When we infer cause, we can only legitimately infer just what is required for the effect (170). 

So, If we say billiard ball 1 hit billiard ball 2 and caused it to roll, we can infer the cause to be billiard ball 1’s motion, we cannot legitimately infer it that billiard ball 1 was red, cold, belonging to Rachel, and inherently lucky.  This same requirement of matter holds for causes that are rational and intelligent beings.  If we see an artist’s painting we cannot infer he would be a talented sculptor or dancer (171).  So, if we say gods are responsible for creating the existence and order of the universe, we cannot give them more attributes than required for the creating of an ordered universe.  So, we cannot infer their talents at dancing either…  “The supposition of farther attributes is mere hypothesis…” (171).

5)

But…we still make mistakes…

When we find a phenomenon in nature, we are immediately inclined (however wrongly) to think we have found a cause.  It must be God! 

Then…

We get really carried away and “forget that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary, or, at least, without any foundation in reason; and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities, but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his production” (172).  Silly!!!  Says friend… “Why torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon suppositions, which, for aught you know, may be entirely imaginary, and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature?” (173).  Etc.

6)

Conclusion:

“The religious hypothesis, therefore, must be considered only as a particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the universe: but no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any single fact, and alter or add to the phenomena, in any singular particular” (173).  Rest before inferring more than you can!  Or else, “…I must admonish you, that you have departed from the method of reasoning…” (173).

7)

Thus… “Where, then, is the odiousness of that doctrine, which I teach in my school, or rather, which I examine in my garden?”  Because… remember, he only needed to show religion/politics should keep to its own realm and not concern itself with speculative philosophy.  Friend says he (as Epicurus) rejects Supreme Governor of world who guides events and punishes and rewards… “But surely, I deny not the course itself of events, which lies open to every one’s inquiry and examination” (173).  To argue against this, one would have to infer beyond what is legitimate.  Divinity may have lots of other traits, but we cannot know them and certainly CANNOT infer them from what we do have experience of. 

8)

Is there evidence of Distributive Justice in the world?  (175)

If yes, then it is legitimate argument it exists.

If no, then illegitimate.

If maybe, then you cannot affirm it.

Friend/Epicurus concludes (175).

Hume comments and adds some challenges and additions:

1) Thanks, you used the argument I like.

2) But… from experience as the foundation of the argument (as well as knowledge itself) can’t we propose a counter argument? 

i.e.:

A half-finished building

A single footprint in the sand

From the former I infer it is a work in progress by design.

From the latter I infer that a person walked by and the tide must have washed the ther foot’s footprint away.

These are legitimate inferences according to my theory.

So, why can we not infer for God too?

Friend:

We can legitimately infer for humanity; we have lots of experience with humanity. 

We cannot legitimately infer for divinity; we have no experience of Him (176-77). 

A Maxim, thus: 

“In general, it may, I think, be established as a maxim, that where any cause is known only by its particular effects, it must be impossible to infer any new effects from that cause; since the qualities, which are requisite to produce these new effects along with the former, must either be different, or superior, or of more extensive operation, than those which simply produced the effect, whence alone the cause is supposed to be known to us.  We can never, therefore, have any reason to suppose the existence of these qualities” (177-178).

And don’t think you can add “energy” to the argument and make it work… (178).  The source of our mistake here is that we presume we can infer for God from what we know about ourselves and other humans… silly!!!  We are crummy, he is not (178).

3) 

Okay, so I like your premises… But… your conclusions! 

A confusion of CAN and OUGHT…

Your view: religious doctrines can have no influence on life because they ought not to because they are crummy reasoning.  But… come now!  Even those religious folk who are mistaken, if I try to correct them, I may free them from their passions (their delusions) but I am also taking their liberty and forcing my law upon them (179).  Seems to Hume that “the state ought to tolerate every principle of philosophy; nor is there an instance, that any government has suffered in its political interests by such indulgence” (179). 

4) 

This one may be delicate… so will propose it with no explanation:

Hume says he doubts a cause may be known only by its effect.  Experience, observation, and analogy guide us in inferences; effects and causes must, then, have some similarity to one another and similarities to other like causes and effects.  In other words, could we really ever infer any sort of God from what we do experience?  Is He not so dramatically different from the stuff we experience and from other causes that we cannot legitimately infer him?  (180).

§  12: Of the Academical or Skeptical Philosophy (3 parts)

(part one):

Religious philosophers say they have proved God’s existence and refuted the atheists; yet then they dispute if anyone could possibly be a an atheist (be so blind).  But this is illogical.  Did a dragon-slaying knight ever wander the world and doubt there was such a thing as dragons? 

In addition to atheist enemies to religion, there are also Skeptics.

Hume’s Questions:

“What is meant by a sceptic?  And how far it is possible to push these philosophic principles of doubt and uncertainty?” (181).

One type of Skepticism:

That antecedent to philosophy insisted upon by Descartes: that which requires an Universal Doubt towards all previous opinions, principles, and even faculties.  We must assure ourselves of their legitimacy by a chain of reasoning deduced from a certain original principle (181). 

Hume argues this is impossible!  There is no such originary principle and, even if there was, how would we ever move beyond it with those faculties we were doubting? 

Cartesian doubt, if we could do, we could never come back from it (181)!!!

However… if we take a moderate species of this skepticism… perfect! 

i.e., his ideal methodology:

“To begin with clear and self-evident principles, to advance by timorous and sure steps, to review frequently our conclusions, and examine accurately all their consequences; though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems; are the only methods, by which we can ever hope to reach truth, and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations” (182). 

Another type of Skepticism:

That consequent to philosophy (science and enquiry) that is supposed to be the result of the discovery of the falsity of their faculties and that humanity cannot reach certainty on speculative matters.  Everything from senses to general maxims of common life are subjected to this skepticism. 

Evidence Against the Veracity of the Senses:

The “Trite” evidence: drawn from the imperfection of our organs: the oar looks crooked in water, size variance of objects seen from variable distances, double images from a harmed eye…

Hume says this evidence is weak, it merely shoes “…the senses alone are not implicitly to be depended on; but that we must correct their evidence by reason, and by considerations, derived from the nature of the medium, the distance of the object, and the disposition of the organ, in order to render them, within their sphere, the proper criteria of truth and falsehood” (182).

These are quickly dismissed, but… there are other more challenging arguments against the senses:

“It seems evident, that men are carried, by a natural instinct or prepossession, to repose faith in their senses… [leading to] we always presuppose an external universe…” that does not depend upon us (182-3). 

Further, we presuppose that the images presented to us by our senses are the external objects.  We think everything we see has cold, hard, real existence as external and independent things out there in the world and that they will go on existing just like that out there when we leave. 

We believe that:

“Our presence bestows not being on it: our absence does not annihilate it” (183). 

But, foolish!  Says Hume…  “…nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets, though which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object” (183).

So… as we walk out of the class room the far window seems to get smaller and smaller, fuzzier, harder to see out of… but, of course, the window itself does not do any of these things.  So, what is the window?  The REAL window does not change.  The window that we now perceive from a distance has changed.  Thus, the REAL window is an image in our minds.  (Hume’s example: table). 

What?  Why?  Because we don’t ever have direct immediacy between mind-window… (no logical connexion!) we only have the window as an image presented to the mind though our senses (thus, copied, become idea, which we could mix about, but regardless…) …there is no logical connection between this image or idea and the thing there in the world… really, we CANNOT rationally justify that there is any such independent, external world. 

(a) Think…. How do we know?  Though experience.  Experience would be the only way that we could justify the external world; but experience cannot take us beyond the perceptions we are questioning!  (“She [philosophy] can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of nature…”!! 183, and “But here experience is, and must be entirely silent” 184) 

(b) And… we CANNOT bring in reason to explain, because, besides the fact that “matters of fact” can only be proved with experience, so we cannot legitimately introduce reasoning in to it, even if we could, reason can only tell us about relations of ideas (math), but not about any other principles. 

(c) And… heaven forbid!! Do not take recourse to a Supreme Being to prove the veracity of our senses!!!  (What an odd twist of logic that would be!  i.e. Descartes!)  (184).  So again: belief in the external world is not rationally justifiable.  With this sort of skepticism, the skeptic will always ‘win.’  There is no escape from it.

Another Skeptical Topic:  Divide Primary and Secondary Qualities:  (185-6).

Descartes mentioned Primary and Secondary properties as distinct in the Wax analogy. Hume’s interpretation here refers to a skepticism that would say all the secondary qualities (the sensory ones, color, hardness, temperature) are not in the things themselves, but are in the perceptions of the mind and lack any universal. 

While some would argue, then, that the primary qualities like extension and breadth must be essential to the thing (like Descartes), Hume says the skeptic must refuse this and show that these are just as sensory-dependent because we cannot conceive of extension without having it as an idea formed from the impressions from sight and touch, etc.

Summation: 

First Skeptical Objection to Senses:

Evidence of Senses or External existence are opinions that IF they rested on natural instinct, they are contrary to reason; IF they rested on reason, they are contrary to experience/instinct.  Both IF’s lack any rational evidence.

Second Skeptical Objection to Senses:

But, if all sensible qualities (primary and secondary) are in the mind, then we have annihilated matter.  All matter becomes “…a certain unknown, inexplicable something, as the cause of our perceptions…” (186).

(part two):

“It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the skeptics to destroy reason by argumentation and ratiocination…” (187).

Hume’s attack against the extreme skeptics:proceeding from Space and Time

Divisibility  (187)

They promote a doctrine of the infinite divisibility of extension (i.e., Zeno’s arrow).

But, math aside, in the everyday world, I can walk from the desk to the door and actually get there.

Time   (188)

Infinite divisibility of time (every now annihilated in infinite succession of new nows).

But, we experience time as more lived, we remain in our now with easy access to past nows and future nows.

The Skeptical Objections to Moral (i.e., all that is non-math) Evidence:

(1) Popular objections:

weakness of human understanding

contradictory opinions

opinions change over time and by place (all relative)

contradictions between young and old

judgment varies when sick or healthy

etc.

In general, “It is needless to insist farther on this head.  These objections are weak” (189).

No matter how much we want to be skeptics and suspend judgment for these reasons, the moment we actually get confronted with things again, we forget our austere reprimands.  Or, it is fine to withhold all belief in the classroom, but the moment you go out into the world, you have no choice but to assent to it. 

(2) Philosophic objections:

arise from evidence that Hume has uncovered concerning the source of knowledge in experience and derived from principles like cause and effect that are only substantiated by custom…  but… the skeptic will then conclude nothing is possible.  The most powerful objection to excessive skepticism: “…no durable good can ever result from it…”  In other words, what use is it?  What good is it?  The skeptic cannot say.

Copernicus or Ptolemy (note: they oppose one another) could answer they will produce a constant and durable conviction with their audiences. 

A Stoic or Epicurean (note: they oppose one another) could answer they will produce a constant and durable conviction with their audiences and that these convictions may affect conduct and behavior (190-1).

A radical skeptic can yield neither constancy nor beneficial consequence (191).  Extreme skepticism leads to inaction.  “…he must acknowledge that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail.  All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence” (191).

The everydayness, natural attitude and instinct, saves us, we may not know anything for sure, but custom has shown us a few things and encouraged us to believe them (even if not rationally, demonstratively true).  We will not die for the principle of skepticism.

“Nature is always too strong for principle” (191). 

(part three):

But there is a sort of non-extreme or mitigated, moderate skepticism of academical philosophy that is essentially useful (191)!  It can improve the ignorant (by making them pause and reason past their prejudices) (191-2).  It can improve the learned (by making them cool their pride by realizing the universal perplexity in human nature) (192).  Further, it can also benefit humanity by narrowly limiting enquiry to those areas that can be discerned by the limited faculty of human understanding (192). 

Imagination is “naturally sublime,” it delights in how far and wild it can go… but correct judgment can only be wrought by remaining within the confines of experience. Leave all the fancy from imagination to the poets, priests, and politicians (192).  If we stick to the limits of our understanding, we can begin to see the proper subjects of science and enquiry:returning to first stated goals

For “relations of ideas”: stick to math, not marx (193).  For “matters of facts”: these are incapable of demonstration; whatever is can not be; this contradiction is perfectly legitimate and no matter of fact can be harmed by contraries (194).

How does this yield a comment on existence:  

“The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or effect; and these arguments care founded entirely on experience.  If we reason a priori, anything may appear able to produce anything.  The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, extinguish the sun; or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits.  It is only experience, which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another.  Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greater part of human knowledge, and is the source of al human action and behaviour” (194).

Then goes through and comments on different philosophy/sciences, limits religion to a foundation in faith, and ends:

“If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?  No.  Does it contain any experimental [i.e. experiential] reasoning concerning mater of fact and existence?  No.  Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion” (195). 

I.e. if it employs reason, it better be about math.  If it does not employ experience, it it will yield no knowledge. 

The end.